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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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Most of the scheduled contents of this issue of NATIONAL REVIEW, including our regular columnists, Burnham, Meyer and Kirk, were ripped out at the last minute to make way for the publication of a number of documents of historic importance. Concerning them we are free to say only a few things:

1) We cannot discuss their source.

2) We judge them to be extraordinarily revealing particularly insofar as they thrust into an appropriate context the fragments published by the New York Times and given such wide international notice.

3) Notwithstanding this, a study of these documents shows that they are themselves fragmentary. In the little time we had, we published those that seemed most pointed, leaving the appendices and other explanatory material aside, for possible publication later.

4) Although we found the analysis of the minority members of the Supreme Court plausible, and in some instances arresting, we are guided by the opinion of the majority. It is clear that the operative understanding of the First Amendment justifies us in publishing Top Secret documents, having first determined that they are not damaging to the national security.

5) This we have established. And, making the proper distinction, we have inquired, and reflected, on whether they advance the national interest. We are satisfied that they do.

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

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FOR THE RECORD

■ Most of the readers of **Stephen Schlesinger**'s *New Democrat* ("The Only Magazine for Democrats") are left-liberals and here's what they think about the Presidential hopefuls. Who would you most like to see run in '72? **McGovern** (29 per cent), **Kennedy** (16), **Harold Hughes** (14), **Ramsey Clark** (11). Who would you least like to see win the nomination? **Jackson** (46 per cent), **Humphrey** (29). In the "least like" question McGovern, Hughes, Clark got no negative votes, Kennedy did. . . . George McGovern's pitch to the far Left included sending a personal representative to the inauguration of the new radical-left mayor of Berkeley, **Warren Widener** (McGovern had been going to send a telegram but the WU strike prevented it). . . . Other possible candidates to head the third party that **Gore Vidal** and **Benjamin Spock** were busy organizing in Albuquerque a fortnight ago: **Eugene McCarthy**, **John Lindsay**, **Julian Bond**, Ramsey Clark, **César Chavez**, according to spokesman **John Salazar**. **Ralph Nader** says he's not interested. . . . Assistant Producer **Jeff Gralnick** of the TV show *Sixty Minutes* has taken job as McGovern press aide. Quips *Monday*: "That's about as long as McGovern is expected to last once he gets to the convention in '72."

■ **New York**'s a Summer Festival Notes: Sighted on the street, a huge red dump truck with large white stencilled notice on its side: "Let's Help New York—by Dumping Lindsay." . . . Lots of groups are. **GE** pulled its administrative headquarters out of New York a month ago. **IBM** is expected to announce within the fortnight that it will also close up shop in Fun City, moving its main operations elsewhere. . . . It's almost a tie in New York City hospitals. Figures at the end of the first year show that 950 babies are being **aborted** for every thousand permitted to live, and abortion forces hope to top that record next year. . . . **Orthodox Jews** moving against abortion. At Long Island Right to Life meeting a fortnight ago in which Catholics, Protestants and Jews were represented a letter was read from Israel's Chief Rabbinate appealing to Jews all



Handelsman, *Punch* Ben Roth Agency

"You mean we're still playing the Vietcong? What's the score?"

over the world to avoid abortions because they are "contrary to Jewish religious laws." (A meeting earlier this year in Miami of the major American Jewish Orthodox organizations also came out against abortion.) . . . That public employees union that brought New York to a standstill a month or so ago by opening all the bridges, abandoning trucks across highways etc. has been punished for violating the **Taylor anti-strike law**. It won't be permitted to have its union check-off privileges for nine long months.

■ **Auto Workers Union** in considerable trouble as result of two-month **GM** strike last fall, heavy dropoffs in employment, in aerospace industry particularly. President **Leonard Woodcock** reported at Miami Beach convention that GM strike had cost the union $160 million, and that its net assets were down 98.8 per cent from 1969. . . . The UAW's West Coast regional director **Paul Schrade** is under attack by an insurgent group within the union for spending so much time on political activities (mostly on the peace front). The dissidents claim to have thirty thousand signatures on a recall petition. . . . Sen. **Paul Fannin** (R., Ariz.) will try to attach amendment restricting labor unions from exacting compulsory dues for political purposes on electoral reform bill.

■ More purges: Guinean refugees in Paris say President **Sékou Touré** has arrested five thousand political opponents in past two months in continuing purge touched off by invasion of **Guinea** last November. . . . **Poland** is reviewing its two million party members with a view to expelling "parasites" and other bad guys from party ranks. . . . Communist Party of **France** indignant: Peking has informed the French government that it would be "undesirable" for two French Communists to be included in the delegation of French parliamentarians that has been invited to Red China. (The French CP is Moscow-oriented.) . . . **Joan Baez**, who is starred in Italian movie on **Sacco-Vanzetti** (dig her crooning, "Sacco-Vanzetti you are always in our hearts") in an interview in France mentioned **Angela Davis** and said: "Sacco-Vanzetti trials are quite possible in the U.S. given the official attempts at repressing the people's movements for justice." . . . **Antonio Alberto Neto**, an Angolan rebel leader, told the **Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee** at a Warsaw meeting recently: "Stepping up our liberation armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism is the MPLA's [his organization] contribution to free Angela Davis."

■ Most platonic note of the season: Report from the **Library of Congress** that the latest publication it is putting into braille is: *Playboy*.

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LETTERS

Pentagon Papers

I was disappointed with your editorial "I Have in My Hand a Photostatic Copy of . . ." ["The Week," June 29]. It skims over or lightly dismisses or totally ignores the most important points of the case.

The final decision on this case will, obviously, set a precedent of huge importance. But your editorial implied that as, in the author's opinion, the documents did not contain information vital to the security of the United States, it was all right for the *Times* to publish them. Yet here is where the matter of precedents comes in. What is at issue is: 1) whether it is for a newspaper (or whoever procures stolen documents) to decide on the correctness of their classification, and 2) whether a newspaper, having decided that the documents should not be classified, may print them and then see if people agree with its judgment. But a newspaper is very poorly qualified to pass judgment on such matters, for a journalist, concerned with his paper's circulation, can't be expected to approach objectively the possibility of printing exciting classified documents.

It is not only the legal verdict on the case that sets a precedent, for the very act of a major newspaper's printing secret government documents encourages the future theft of more exciting reading material, with very serious consequences.

It seems to me that the *New York Times* is a receiver of stolen goods; and that a "fence" is entitled to few parts of the Constitution except the Fifth Amendment.

New York, N.Y. ANDREW CLARK

Fulbright and Cambodia

In an astonishing erratum ["The Week," June 29], you say: "On April 6, NATIONAL REVIEW commented on a news item from *Human Events* reporting that two researchers for Senator Fulbright, James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, who 'had never been in Southeast Asia, brought forth a study that blistered President Nixon for his invasion of Cambodia. In November, Fulbright sent the pair to Indochina for an on-the-spot inspection and they came back with a report that Mr. Nixon had done exactly the right thing in invading Cambodia. That report Fulbright failed to publicize.' Everything about that story appears to be inaccurate."

Then, in the spirit of Archimedes—Eureka, we now have the *real* story—you point out that Lowenstein and Moose *had* been in Southeast Asia before, the second report was "by no means a rave for the Administration," and "Mr. Fulbright *did* enter it into the *Congressional Record*," thus leaving the assumption that *Human Events*, alas, is to blame for these terrible blunders.

I agree that everything about your April 6 story appears to be inaccurate, but none of this misinformation was retrieved from *Human Events*. We wrote two stories on the Lowenstein-Moose report and the central thrust of those stories was this: a) Lowenstein and Moose wrote a report for Fulbright on Cambodia which "provided an astonishing amount of support for President Nixon's rationale in helping the Cambodian government," and b) Senator Fulbright, instead of trumpeting its findings, made a "quiet insertion of the study into the *Congressional Record* on December 16" and "tried to bury the study by sandwiching it between general material that favored Fulbright's antiwar and anti-Cambodian position." These assertions are absolutely true.

ALLAN H. RYSKIND
Capitol Hill Editor
Washington, D.C. *Human Events*

NATIONAL REVIEW *regrets the confusion, and the inadvertent victimization of* Human Events. *The whole story was confusing to begin with, particularly in the light of the report that Mr. Lowenstein will attempt a come-back by running for his old seat in Nassau County, and that Mr. Moose, who used to write speeches for President Eisenhower, should now find himself working for Senator Fulbright.*

—ED.

SF v. NY

During the past several years I have become more and more disturbed by a growing phenomenon on the other coast of the U.S. If David Brudnoy is correct ["Delectations," June 1], and They are calling San Francisco *The City*, a crisis has been reached. I've lived most of my life in NYC. I doubt that any native San Franciscan (or whatever they call themselves amidst their delusions) has even a vague feeling for what a city is. It is not "clean streets." It is not "a pleasing architectural mix." Disneyland has those. As to their sophistication: What the hell is so sophisticated about pushing their pretty little town as *The City*? We don't do it for New York because *we know*.

Let me clear the matter up for you. A city *isn't nice things*. Ask Carl Sandburg. It's grit in your mouth and sulfur in your eyes. It's a delicate blend of fear and no place to park. A city is seeing that your will is in order before going to Coney Island to enjoy a hot dog. It's Ratso Rizzo and the Knicks at the Garden, the Gallo brothers (*not* Ernest and Julio) and da Bronx, the only community in America with its own definite article. Let's face it, if a book about San Francisco were called *The Godfather*, it would be about a christening.

Let me tell you something. If Goldwater's '64 fantasy were modified, and New York City were sawed off from the rest of the country, New York wouldn't drift out to sea. The rest of you would.

So, knock it off.

Flatbush ROBERT FOSTER

Can't Stand the Heat?

W. W. Yale ["The Climate's All Wrong," June 15] fails to consider either the effect of reverse psychology or the concept of purification through adversity. The activities of obstreperous ochlocrats are at the top of my list of reasons to remain in the service of my country. Similarly, I find the migration of those who cannot stand the "heat" of the "climate" to be entirely salubrious.

Kincheloe AFB, Mich. MARK O. SIMMONS

Kent State

I am afraid that your obstinate opinion on "The Kent State Four" ["The Week," May 18] overstepped the bounds of good taste. I cannot believe you would vindicate, even indirectly, the shootings on our campus last year. Certainly, your conclusion that "the Kent State Four died as a result of the encouragement of street politics and mob rule . . ." may very well be true, but nowhere do you show any regret that four people were killed. In fact, you imply that two of them deserved the fate they met; and nowhere did you point out that it was possible for students, entirely unaware of the rioters approaching from the other side of a hill, to have been shot. Indeed, this was the case.

We, as conservatives, are in a position to offer the only true peace; i.e., one with freedom and justice (our liberal friends always seem to forget the lack of freedom under Communism). It will not help if you justify the killings of four students who were not looting, not committing arson, not shooting anyone.

Kent, Ohio JAMES VISINTAINER

Gnomes

I do not make a habit of writing to the editor, but when one reads something like

(Continues on page 827)

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THE WEEK

■ Hubert H. Humphrey, lately a hexagenarian and worried about it, has decided to enter the Democratic race for the Presidential nomination—just as soon as there is one. "I do not intend to be a zilch," he insists. Well, at least your rhetoric is sharp, daddy-o.

■ For the first time in 24 years the nation is without a draft law. The House won't approve the Senate's version of the draft-extension law because of the Mansfield Amendment, which calls for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal in nine months if North Vietnam agrees to release all American POWs. The Senate won't pass the law without the Mansfield addition. The Administration isn't all that upset. It wants a draft law, but doesn't want to be tied to the nine-month limit of the Mansfield Amendment, especially now when there seem to be some developments in Paris. Meanwhile nobody is being drafted and the Services are forced to rely on the higher enlistments that occur after June graduation. A fine opportunity to elide into voluntary arrangements.

■ THE BAD OLD DAYS (Letter from Executive Mansion, Washington, May 18, 1864, addressed to Major-General John A. Dix, Commanding at New York): "Whereas there has been wickedly and traitorously printed and published this morning in the *New York World* and *New York Journal of Commerce*, newspapers printed and published in the city of New York, a false and spurious proclamation purporting to be signed by the President and to be countersigned by the Secretary of State, which publication is of a treasonable nature, designed to give aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States and to the rebels now at war against the Government and their aiders and abettors, you are therefore hereby commanded forthwith to arrest and imprison in any fort or military prison in your command the editors, proprietors, and publishers of the aforesaid newspapers, and all such persons as, after public notice has been given of the falsehood of said publication, print and publish the same with intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy; and you will hold the persons so arrested in close custody until they can be brought to trial before a military commission for their offense. You will also take possession by military force of the printing establishments of the *New York World* and *Journal of Commerce*, and hold the same until further orders, and prohibit any further publication therefrom." A. Lincoln

Unreliable Me

If, when politics look dim,
Someone slyly mentions *him*,
I allow myself a grin,
Wondering if he could win.
Sometimes just a photograph
Starts a happy belly-laugh.
Reading of him does it, too:
What am I supposed to do?
When I hear that name I buzz!
That's what Ronald Reagan does.

W. H. VON DREELE

■ Last year, when Harvard Junior Fellow Joseph Rhodes was named to the Scranton Commission on campus violence, Spiro Agnew gave it as his opinion that Rhodes "clearly does not possess the maturity, the objectivity and the judgment to serve on a fact-finding body of national importance." Whereupon the roof fell in on Spiro. Why, all Rhodes had done was suggest that Nixon and Reagan were the real guilty parties in the Kent State killings. Last March at Harvard some left-wing students disrupted a meeting at which several distinguished speakers were putting in a good word for U.S. policy in Vietnam. Harvard's disciplinary apparatus moved slowly, but, at length, seven students were suspended for up to two years, and two received warnings. A letter appeared in the *Crimson* protesting the punishment as "unacceptable" and justifying the disruption on the grounds that the meeting was "propaganda" and, secondly, that it was necessary to reassure the antiwar movement around the country that Harvard was still supporting it. The letter was signed by 23 faculty members and more than fifty teaching fellows and graduate students. Among the latter: Joseph Rhodes.

■ More on the little-known Russian defector Anatol Fedoseyev who, some claim, is really Ignaty Alexandrovitch Nikitrine, the deputy director of the Soviet space program. Various sources say that Nikitrine has precise knowledge of Russian missile development and cybernetics which will enable the U.S. to verify its estimates of Russian research, development and deployment in the field of space weaponry. British officials are busy denying the importance of the Russian defector, and Mr. Fedoseyev—or is it Mr. Nikitrine?—laughs at the suggestion that his importance is comparable to that of Wernher von Braun. Perhaps Daniel Ellsberg will tell us what we want to know.

■ "(An official report issued today said that North Vietnamese soldiers massacred 51 civilians, mostly women and children, and wiped out much of an undefended village north of the Plain of Jars, UPI reported from Saigon. The slaughter was discovered last Saturday by the troops of Gen. Vang Pao, military sources said. Charred and mutilated bodies of the villagers were

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strewn around the refugee village of Phau Bia, where seventy homes were found gutted by fire, the sources said.)" Paragraphs 7 and 8 on page A 14 of the *Washington Post,* July 14, inserted parenthetically in another story headlined: "LAOTIAN FORCES AID TO REGAIN PLAIN OF JARS."

"(United Press International, in a report from Saigon, quoted military sources as having said that Meo tribesmen, on entering the village of Phau Bia north of the Plaine des Jarres on Saturday, found the bodies of 51 civilians who apparently had been slain by enemy troops.)" Paragraph 4 on page 5 of the *New York Times*, July 14, inserted parenthetically in another story headlined: "RAINS COME AND THE LAOTIANS AGAIN TAKE PLAINE DES JARRES."

Question: Where would those stories have appeared in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* had this been an atrocity committed by our side?

■ Perhaps because his international reputation as the bold voice of youth was fading, and with it his usefulness to them, Yevgeny Yevtushenko's masters permitted him to utter a small yelp at the Writers' Union Congress. The Soviet literary establishment is dominated by old men, Yevtushenko complained; his own generation (pushing forty) is treated like children who cannot be trusted: "My contemporaries are at the controls of spaceships but the only controls they are not trusted with are our literary magazines." The Congress listened politely and then elected a new Board of Directors of old men; Yevtushenko got some nice ink in the Western press, and went home to polish his poem on Angela Davis or the Berrigans or whomever. He'll be over here to read it any day now.

■ "There's only two kinds of people, those who work for a living and those who vote for a living."—Yale Brozen

Hanoi: Bearing Gifts

The latest seven-point "peace proposal" was presented July 1, at the regular weekly negotiating session in Paris, by Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, chief delegate of the "Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam"—that is to say, of the Vietcong. However, the United States prisoners, whose fate was the featured item of the proposal, are held by North Vietnam —that is to say, by the government to which Mme. Binh, the Vietcong, and the Provisional Revolutionary charade are subject, and which has never to this day admitted publicly that it has had even one soldier fighting in South Vietnam. (And it is poor Lyndon Johnson who is accused as a deceiver.)

The first thing that might strike a thoughtful reader of the proposal's text is the prose style. Its rhetoric



"No, no, dear. It's the Conservationists who are good and the Conservatives who are bad."

throughout is that of the victor, the conqueror. "Regarding the *deadline* for the *total withdrawal* of U.S. forces." Then the orders: "The U.S. Government *must* put an end to its *war of aggression*, *stop* the policy of 'Vietnamization.' . . . The U.S. *must* set a terminal date for the withdrawal. . . . These two operations *will begin*. . . . A ceasefire *will be observed* . . ." etc. (Italics added.) The terms the victor is dictating are: unconditional capitulation. "The U.S. Government must . . . withdraw from South Vietnam all troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, and dismantle all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, *without posing any condition whatsoever*. . . . The U.S. Government must . . . cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu. . . . The political, social and religious forces in South Vietnam . . . will use various means to form in Saigon a new administration. . . . The U.S. Government must bear full responsibility [i.e., pay reparations] for the losses and destructions it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones [i.e., North and South Vietnam]."

Then comes the tickler: the offer that—*if* the U.S. pledges total withdrawal of its own and all other "foreign" forces (excepting, needless to say, the North Vietnamese), sets a firm terminal date for the completion of withdrawal, and abandons Thieu, the U.S. prisoners, numbers and identity unspecified, will be released during the course of the withdrawal, according to an unspecified schedule.

In comment, first, on the timing. How perfectly correlated with the appearance of the Pentagon Papers. Mme. Binh's presentation of the peace proposal could not have fitted more neatly into Daniel Ellsberg's avowed purposes than if he had planned it himself, or been cued into her plans. And the timing was also finely interlocked with the upsurge inside the U.S. of "the prisoner issue." Not only had this issue been given a rising emotional charge, but a remark of the President's, taken out of context and misinterpreted, gave the Communists the kind of opening they know how to exploit. Mr. Nixon had said once or twice that he was not going to set a date for definite

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U.S. withdrawal while there was no definite Communist undertaking to release the prisoners. By a careless but common logical error (fallacy of the false contrapositive), this was widely interpreted as a statement that he *would* set a date *if* there were an agreement on the prisoners—which the President did not say or imply; he has in fact never said he would set a definite date in advance under any circumstances, and has always included much more than the prisoner issue among the conditions permitting an eventual U.S. withdrawal.

Hanoi's squeezing of the prisoner issue is of more than casual interest. The Vietnamese Communists have often shown a tendency to go in for *reprise*—for repeating a maneuver that has previously worked out successfully. Thus, it seems clear that General Giap believed he was going to turn the Khesanh siege into an American Dienbienphu. And on the prisoner issue they are replaying another groove of the Dienbienphu record. In 1954 the Communists actually controlled only a small portion of total Vietnamese territory (north *or* south), apart from places they had made into military strong points, and at Dienbienphu they did not conquer territory. But they took fourteen thousand prisoners, both French and anti-Communist Vietnamese. France's will to fight had collapsed at home. Mendes-France became the end-the-war premier, and the prisoners were the lever used to get him to rush through the French capitulation.

As Truong Chinh, leader of the North Vietnamese National Assembly, put it last year: "As we won in 1954 thanks to our friends in France, so we shall win this time thanks to our friends in America." ("We Communists," said Marx, "scorn to hide our aims.")

As for the substance of Mme. Binh's proposal, there is no ambiguity. It calls for a U.S. bugout, the liquidation of the anti-Communist Thieu regime, and the setting up of a transition government designed to lead in comparatively short order to the Communist takeover of South Vietnam. The *Economist* (July 10) sums up: "It is worth saying again. The Vietnam war will not come to an end . . . until one of two things happens. Either the Communists will accept a basically non-Communist government in Saigon . . . or the non-Communists will accept the very special sort of coalition the Communists are asking for, in the knowledge that every such coalition formed on Communist terms elsewhere in the world since 1945 . . . has been the last step before a Communist seizure of power. There is no half-way solution between these alternatives."

Our doves are dripping with pieties, and shed oceans of tears for the poor Vietnamese. Their policy is indistinguishable from Mme. Binh's. Exactly like Mme. Binh, they demand a definite and early date for unconditional withdrawal. Mme. Binh, at least, knows what they and she are proposing: to turn eighteen million South Vietnamese over to the Communists.

One puzzle, finally, concerning the reception of Mme. Binh's proposal. What, conceivably, led the White House spokesmen to mumble vaguely in response to it, and speak of "new," "positive" "elements" that must be "further studied"? Why, in God's name, didn't Richard Nixon stand up within the hour of Mme. Binh's proposal to explain, expose, denounce and scornfully reject it as a coarse insult to the honor of this country, of its ally, of all free men, and not least the prisoners themselves, whose sacrifice we intend to validate?

Getting It All Together

So long, Silas Marner;
  Adios, Jane Eyre.
Latin grammar's boring;
  Shakespeare is a square.
Who needs mathematics?
  History's a drag.
Screw the corporations;
  (Business makes them gag).
Cuddle up with Dylan;
  Puff a little grass;
Knit a Panther dolly;
  Hiss the Army brass.
If you had a hand in
  Spawning one of these,
You don't have an offspring:
    You've got a disease.

W. H. von Dreele

Heath and Europe

In his campaign to gain public support for Britain's entry into the Common Market, Prime Minister Edward Heath is displaying the same forthright and resolute leadership he has also shown on tax reform, the electrical and postal workers' strikes, union reform and the Rolls Royce bankruptcy. In a White Paper issued last week he swept aside some of the myths being circulated by the antimarketeers—that common law will be replaced by the Napoleonic code, that the Queen will go—and then faced the realities. Membership will entail a 15 per cent rise in the cost of food over a five-year transition period, and a $560-million annual contribution to the EEC budget. The benefits of membership in terms of productivity, investments, markets, balance of payments and average earnings are expected to be substantial. A failure to join now, says the White Paper, would be disastrous: "In a single generation we should have renounced an imperial past and rejected a European future. Our friends everywhere would be dismayed. They would rightly be as uncertain as ourselves about our future role and place in the world."

The exigencies of Labor Party politics, however, have meanwhile been turning Harold Wilson into a reasonable facsimile of a circus rubber-man. The party is split on the issue. The last thing desired by the big unions,

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which call the tune when the party is out of power, is competition with the more productive European workers: They're all right, Jack. To the Socialist ideologues, membership in the capitalistic EEC would mean the end of their dream of a bureaucratically planned Little England. Wilson, therefore, though he was the one who orignally applied for EEC membership, and though the terms of membership now are close to those he once espoused, is coming out against the entry, but on pragmatic grounds: The price is still too high, and the moment is not opportune. These contortions are dictated by his perception that the split in the Labor Party on so profound an issue as EEC membership could wreck the party for the forseeable future. He is not whistling Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" music, selected last week as the EEC's continental anthem.

Mr. Rostow and What Went Wrong

Appearing on ABC's *Issues and Answers* TV show, Walt W. Rostow, top Kennedy-Johnson foreign policy adviser, said that "the greatest error" made during the 1960s was that the United States did not react sooner and more forcefully to the North Vietnamese threat against its neighboring countries. In the Laos accords of 1962, said Rostow, the Soviet Union agreed to make sure that their Communist ally did not use the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos to supply guerrilla forces in South Vietnam, but it was immediately clear that this agreement was not being honored.

Well, ho hum. Nothing is to be gained at this late date by being hard on Rostow and his confreres of the Kennedy Administration, but they were the experts in charge, and that was some "mistake." On January 14, 1961, *NR* observed editorially: "So now we start up again our run on the treadmill, this time with a small geographic shift to Laos. Why should any man find in this renewal anything to be surprised at? . . . It is not quite exact to say that from Korea to Laos we have come full circle: It is more accurately a spiral, for we curve back at another, and this time much lower, level. We do not face in Laos precisely the same sort of problem we faced in Korea. We face a worse problem, worse situated to deal with it, just as in Korea the problem was much worse than in Eastern Europe in 1945 or Greece in 1947. Our enemy's position is greatly strengthened, his arms brought closer in power to our own. Even in technical terms our military force is less well organized for a fight in Laos than it was a decade ago for a fight in Korea; our allies are more reluctant; our peripheral regions—in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America—are more eroded; an enemy bridgehead [Cuba] has been thrust inside our strategic gate. This time it is much worse for us, and if we continue to refuse to face the reality of the struggle and the challenge of the enemy, it will be still worse at the Korea-Laos of tomorrow."

A year and a half later, both Averell Harriman and Rostow were on TV flacking for the Kennedy policy. On *Meet the Press*, May 7, 1962, Rostow declared: "A neutral [united-front] government" is "the best bet" for Laos. The same day Harriman argued that the Russians *wanted* a neutral Laos "in order to keep the Chinese out."

On May 22 *NR* noted editorially: "The following day, May 8, the Communists made their comment, after their fashion, on the analysis, recommendations and predictions of these two officials charged with responsibility for what we are doing in Southeast Asia. The Communist reply was made, however, not over TV but in the field, in the key strategic town of Nam Tha. Nam Tha, under Communist siege for some while, was overrun by a massive attack launched by a combined force, estimated at four battalions or more, of Laotian Communists (Pathet Lao), North Vietnamese and Red Chinese—supplied in part, as usual, by Russian planes."

Walt Rostow, to his great credit, still desires to resist Communist domination of Southeast Asia—which is one reason he's teaching in Texas and not at MIT. But that was some mistake.

Doing It the Hard Way

With unemployment hovering in the 6 per cent range, prices increasing at the rate of 5 per cent a year, and a sickly balance of international payments, no one can accuse President Nixon of taking the easy way out of the current economic maze. It goes almost without saying that the annual midyear review of the Administration's economic game plan by the congressional Joint Economic Committee concludes with the traditional chorus of DO SOMETHING! by assorted politicians and liberal academic types. But the President's unconventional response is what *Newsweek* peevishly calls "Nixon's Four Point Do-Nothing Plan." To wit: 1) no wage-price review board; 2) no mandatory wage-price controls; 3) no tax cuts; 4) no increased government spending beyond the presently budgeted totals.

Instead of "Something for Everybody," the Nixon policy seems like "Nothing for Anyone." Curiously, the only economic policymaker in Washington who is acting like a politician these days is Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur Burns, who, for reasons he has failed to make convincing, keeps plugging away for a wage-price review board.

As the Administration sees it, wage-price controls and review boards a) are messy, and b) don't work. With this assessment *NR* is in full agreement. So far as fiscal and monetary policies are concerned, the President's advisers feel that "there's plenty of coal in the furnace," given the recent rapid rate of growth in the money supply (over 11 per cent since December) and the staggering federal budget deficits (over $20 billion) in the current and just-concluded fiscal years. The hope is that

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by mid-1972 (which, as it happens, is a few months prior to the next Presidential election) the economy will have enough steam to bring unemployment down to more acceptable levels, but not at a pressure that would keep prices rising at a rate of 5 per cent.

The President has clearly chosen a risky and politically difficult course of action for a game in which the cost of failure might well be the collapse of his chance for re-election. His policy, however, is founded on the sober and clear-sighted realization that in economics there is no easy way out of the inflation-unemployment dilemma.

The Times, Vietnam and Security

"Fortunately, the new Vietnamese rulers are dedicated anti-Communists who reject any idea of neutralism and pledge themselves to stand with the free world. . . . If the new regime succeeds in identifying itself with the aspirations of the people, it will have taken a long step toward repulsing further Communist inroads throughout Southeast Asia."—Editorial, "Opportunity in Vietnam," *New York Times*, November 3, 1963.

"The goal of American policy in Indochina, as we have repeatedly declared, must be the creation of a situation in which those agreements [Geneva, 1954 and 1962] can be truly effectuated. This implies an end to the subversion by North Vietnam and Communist China in Laos and South Vietnam.

"The chief obstacle to such a settlement at the moment is undoubtedly the belief of Peking and Hanoi that they can win control of the entire area by continuing their present tactics. The use of additional American military and economic resources to disabuse Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh of such illusions is entirely justified."—Editorial, "War against China?," *New York Times*, June 21, 1964.

"The United States joined battle with the Vietcong guerrillas in the rice paddies of South Vietnam two and a half years ago for two simple but impelling reasons:

"1) The United States is the only Western power capable of meeting the Chinese Communist challenge for hegemony in Asia.

"2) The United States wants to demonstrate to the rest of the world that this country has both the desire and the ability to defeat the Communist strategy for expansion—a formula composed of guerrilla military tactics and political and psychological action that Peking refers to as the 'war of national liberation.' . . .

"The fall of Southeast Asia to China or its denial to the West over the next decade, because of the repercussions from an American defeat in Vietnam, would amount to a strategic disaster of the first magnitude."—Neil Sheehan, *New York Times*, August 16, 1964.

"[America is not morally] free to submit to the triumph of the Communist guerrilla techniques without making them pay dearly in the process, for if they succeed in Vietnam, nobody dare assume in Washington that the same techniques will not be applied in all the Communist rimlands from Korea to Iran."—Column by James Reston, *New York Times*, April 25, 1965.

"The *Times*, of course, later changed its mind as it is entitled to do, but its story of how we got into Vietnam is misleading without mentioning the stand-fast mood of the nation in that period—a mood to which the *New York Times* contributed more than its share."—Howard K. Smith, *ABC Evening News*, June 23, 1971.

"[The editorial] was entitled 'Breach of Security,' and it denounced an article 'purporting to tell what went on in the executive committee of the National Security Council. . . . The secrecy of one of the highest organs of the United States has been seriously breached. What kind of advice can the President expect to get under such circumstances? . . . how can anyone be expected to advance positions that may be politically unpopular or unprofitable? Does no one in Washington recall the McCarthy era and the McCarthy technique? . . . The various positions of the members of the NSC taken during deliberation must remain secret. . . . The integrity of the National Security Council, and of the advice received by the President, is at stake.'

"The article that inspired the *New York Times* to this burst of righteous indignation was a *Saturday Evening Post* piece on the Cuban missile crisis by Charles Bartlett and this writer. . . . It contained no word from any NSC paper, or from any other secret document."—Stewart Alsop, *Newsweek*, June 28, 1971.

Looking Ahead: McCloskey

The entry of Rep. Paul N. McCloskey of California into the Republican primary picture does not come as a surprise. First sighted as a dove, McCloskey is now sitting on a teeming nest of left-liberal eggs—anti-ABM, anti-SST, inching into Women's Lib, pressing legalized abortion, attacking Vietnamization, accusing the U.S. of war crimes. Nor is McCloskey's emergence as a sort of West Coast Lindsay surprising, either. He opposed Goldwater, voted for Pierre Salinger against George Murphy, and is rumored to have voted for Humphrey in 1968. He has a higher ADA rating than John Tunney, California's new Democratic senator. Politically, McCloskey is a close associate of Allard Lowenstein, and most of his support reportedly emanates from sources not accustomed, to put it mildly, to backing Republicans.

McCloskey no doubt desires to repeat Eugene McCarthy's performance in 1968, when his capture of New Hampshire's delegates revealed the extent of Democratic disaffection from Lyndon Johnson. That McCloskey can make much headway seems improbable. Consider New Hampshire. In 1968, Nixon scored a TKO over George Romney and then rolled up 84,000 votes in the Repub-

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WHITTAKER CHAMBERS 1961-1971

Ten Years Dead

It is not true that Whittaker Chambers died ten years ago. He died long before his great heart stopped beating, and he still lives today for those of us who loved him. I need only re-read his letters to me to know that he is still alive, need only look back over the years to know how real was his death. Time has slipped by, but it could have been yesterday that I sat on the porch of the "back farm" in Westminster, watching the kingfishers circle, looking down the long vista of trees and hills fading in the sloping light, listening to that quiet voice parse the agony of our era, looking into those blue and prescient eyes which minimized the pain of living even as they saw life plain.

It is hard to think of Whittaker Chambers without forgetting that in our culture men must not cry, that they must ignore the fate incumbent in the flesh. And yet for me, it is no shame to cry for there was a bond between us which transcended friendship and blood. By birth, he was a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant—but he was the only American I have ever known who was of heart and mind a Spaniard ("We Mediterraneans," he would say) with that combination of Caliphate Arab, Jew and Visigoth which makes up the Spanish character, that pride grown of humility, that understanding of the human condition which found itself in a line from John of the Cross: *"Pués si más vivo más muero."*

I have been re-reading his letters, and they have brought back to me the immediacy of his presence and the nature of my loss, the world's loss. They are letters that should be read and not read—read because they show so clearly that ten and fifteen years ago he had foreseen the swift decline and military disintegration of our Christian civilization, not read because they evoke a rediscovery of his life's tragedy.

YET he was in no wise a tragic figure. The tragedy that inhered in him was a function of his stern and passionate realization that the Twilight of the Gods was also the Twilight of Man, that he was a witness to a struggle as titanic as that between God and Lucifer—except that in our time's plague Lucifer had most of the artillery. He saw the enemy as Communism, not merely its vulgar and bureaucratic manifestations in the Kremlin but in a world-view and a philosophy of man that those who professed to oppose it partially embraced. He was a revolutionist, for these are times requiring revolutionary solutions, who had contemplated both Heaven and Hell and knew the discomforts of both and who could reflect with no breath of sacrilege, "Is dirt nice, is death nice? And above all, is dying nice? And, in the end, we must ask: Is God nice? I doubt it"—yet always aware, with Rilke, that we make our God *"das Harte aus dem Harten."*

He will be remembered by many for the Hiss Case—a case which all too briefly opened the eyes of some to the nature of the struggle—but in his final days, he saw himself as a Laocoön who had flung his spear into the Trojan Horse only to see the walls breached as it was dragged into the citadel. His reward was not to be strangled by snakes but to be nibbled to death by what he disdainfully called the "man-eating squirrel"—a phrase he used describe the temporizers of our time, the "people of Ozone Park and Washington, clamping leech-like to that little job," to the safety of an ideological half-world.

WAS HE RIGHT in his constant admonition that the meaning of the Hiss Case, never fully comprehended, would be quickly forgotten? I think not. It was a battle won, where so many had been lost in the past and continue to be lost today. But the war continues, as it will until free men cease to take up arms. And we sometimes forget that the true impact of the case was not in the mechanics of exposure or in the nation's fitful reactions. The case brought an obscure, though great, writer and editor to the fore and left his impress on the thinking and emotions of people across the country. It is significant that those who speak or write of Whittaker Chambers dwell most often on his effect on them, on their approach to the overarching questions that impinge on their every waking moment. We may not be many, but we are there—and in his heart he understood this.

But we do wrong if we remember Whittaker Chambers only as a latter-day Jeremiah or a deutero-Isaiah. He was a man who knew humor and the taste of irony. "Two *Requiems*," he wrote when I sent him some liturgical records. "One would have done us." Or of a Shostakovitch composition: "We particularly liked the chorus of female left Mensheviks and the basso solo, which we took, for our Russian is not quite up to these capers, to represent the entrance of the *Zemlia y Volya*, chanting: Over the hill and through the woods to Beria's house we go." On learning that a copy of Pliny was not available in the bookstores: "Lattimore a best-seller and Pliny out of print! If Odacer and Alaric had not thought writing effeminate, I suppose our shelves would be crowded with their *Ordeal by High Office* and *I Liberated Rome*."

Were he alive today, this discomfitting irreverence would probably be aimed at the chorus of male Keynesians charged with our goverance, still dancing to Beria's house. But who can speak for him now or predict what his thoughts would be in this time of peril? Ten years after his death, I prefer to remember him on one of those breathing spring days in Westminster, when he heard the car approach, opened his door, waved, and smiled. Perhaps on the End Day, if our sins are forgiven, we will once more see that opening door, and the smile.

R. DE TOLEDANO

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LETTER FROM WASHINGTON

Attorney General John Mitchell will leave the Administration late this year, probably in December, to run the Nixon re-election drive. His departure will mean that the political effort, which was managed almost exclusively from the executive branch during the middle years of the Nixon Administration, will now be concentrated in a citizen's organization and in the Republican National Committee. Since late 1970 the President has been concerned with the Administration's image as "mostly a political organization." This has been reflected in the departure of political operative Murray Chotiner from the White House staff and the move of Harry Dent from the White House proper to the Executive Office Building.

Speculation about Mitchell's successor centers on four names.

—Richard Kleindeinst, Deputy Attorney General and probably the second most powerful man in the Justice Department. Kleindeinst knows the Department and would be able to maintain continuity. His thinking on legal matters is close to Mitchell's.

—John Ehrlichman, White House domestic-affairs chief and liaison man with the Justice Department on political matters. A rumor is current that Ehrlichman has withdrawn himself from consideration, probably because his present position gives him more power—though less charisma. If Ehrlichman moves to Justice, it will signal a major downgrading of domestic legislative initiatives in 1972.

—Clark MacGregor, former Minnesota congressman and now chief lobbyist for White House programs on Capitol Hill. As a lobbyist, MacGregor has been singularly successful: He is well-liked, has instituted several new and informative means of putting the White House point of view to senators and representatives, and has won several important votes. MacGregor is so valuable that some wonder why the White House would move him to Justice.

—William P. Rogers, present Secretary of State and seemingly low man on the Administration's foreign-policy totem pole. During the last Eisenhower Administration, Rogers served as Attorney General and is said to have liked it. The shift from State would seem at first glance an odd one, but sources report that Rogers feels he might be able to do more at Justice. Furthermore, at Justice he would be comfortably situated for a second Nixon Administration in which the somewhat diminished responsibilities of the Secretary of State could be taken on by someone else.

The appointment of either MacGregor or Rogers would indicate a move toward a new image for the 1972 campaign; the appointment of Kleindeinst or Ehrlichman would indicate business as usual. The appointment of John Connally as Secretary of the Treasury suggested the President's fondness for surprises, however, and some wholly unthought-of option remains possible—especially with the electoral benefits that might be reaped from a particularly imaginative choice.

■ The addition of Fred Harris to the Democratic Presidential sweepstakes is not so much of a puzzler as it looks. Harris has not pleased his constituents in his Senate career, nor was his term as Democratic National Chairman particularly successful. With his political fortunes in Oklahoma looking grim and a stiff primary fight with Congressman Ed Edmondson impending, Harris can run for President about as easily as he can run for renomination or re-election.

—CATO

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lican column, 79.1 per cent. This total was larger than that of any candidate in any primary in the history of the state, and larger than the *combined* vote of all other candidates on the ballot, Republican and Democratic. In 1964, when not a serious candidate, Nixon still got almost sixteen thousand write-ins in New Hampshire. In 1960, unopposed, he got 65,000 votes. Back in 1956, a huge New Hampshire write-in for Nixon snuffed out Harold Stassen's Herter-for-Vice President boomlet. Nixon is strong in New Hampshire. In 1968, however, moving on to the Wisconsin primary, he proved even stronger than in New Hampshire, with 79.4 per cent of the vote. In six highly varied Republican primaries in 1968, Nixon, whether opposed or unopposed, consistently got over 70 per cent of the vote. In Oregon, for example, the final primary, it was Nixon 73 per cent, Reagan 22 per cent, and Rockefeller over the falls with 4 per cent. Nixon, clearly, is strong in Republican primaries, and, though it is now another year, these figures suggest the magnitude of the task facing McCloskey.

In a careful and on the whole accurate pair of editorials assessing the political realities, the *New York Times*, semi-official organ of the Establishment-in-exile, and thus speaking with the political authority of an *Al Ahram* if not of *Pravda*, has staked out its position for the forthcoming political season. First, turning to the Republicans, the *Times* gives up officially its attempts to move Nixon, or the Republican Party, to the left. "As the years have passed and the decisions been made . . . this centrist Administration on most of the big issues has come down on the right-of-center side. . . . Mr. Nixon is always mindful of the power of Senator Goldwater, Senator Thurmond and Governor Reagan. The support of their constituencies made his nomination possible. In his efforts to manage public opinion with regard to the Vietnam war, his nominations to the Supreme Court, his approach to crime and civil liberties, and his dispensing of patronage and political influence, President Nixon has catered to conservatives. . . . GOP progressives feel more isolated and enfeebled than at any time in the last thirty years. Their sense of weakness is hardly a source of party strength and morale in key industrial states." Correctly understood, this is accurate enough, the *Times* at last officially recognizing the depth, and success, of the Goldwater revolution. In 1968 Nixon traded off anticipated losses in the Northeast for sizable gains elsewhere. And, as the *Times* recognizes, nothing suggests that Nixon either wishes to—or even could—change this strategy.

Given these realities, the *Times*, correctly, holds out small hope for a McCloskey counterrevolution in the GOP. In its following editorial, on the Democrats, the *Times* votes early: Any liberal Democrat at all is preferable to Nixon, and, as of now, "Muskie Is the One." Humphrey is old-hat, and, even wearing bell-bottoms, has been compromised by Vietnam. McGovern would fracture the party. Teddy, in the *Times*' inimitable formulation, "did not demonstrate" at Chappaquiddick "the

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National Review's Summer Savings Special

LAST CHANCE



LAST CHANCE

Effective May 16 the postal rates increased greatly. This presented us with a dilemna. As the postal rates go up, so does the cost of renewing all our subscribers, etc. So if we could only avoid mailing all those renewal notices at the higher rates we could save literally thousands of dollars in expense. And we'd be more than happy to pass our savings on to our readers. Here's the offer:

Renew your current subscription *now;* we will extend it for a full year at no more than the regular $12.00 rate. In addition, we'll send you a FREE and postpaid copy of the new edition of Wm. F. Buckley's exciting bestseller, "The Governor Listeth." (The book, in a handsome softcover edition, will be off press and ready to mail on or about June 19.)

> *"The Governor Listeth" is William F. Buckley's newest (and many agree his best) book. It is perfect to take along on your vacation, for that "luxury" reading you've been longing to do, or to introduce that liberal friend of yours to Bill Buckley's writings. The book is a treasure of Buckley's best writing on some fascinating subjects: Public Schools, Religion, Rock, the Kids, the War (much of it written on-the-spot in Vietnam and Laos), Civil Disobedience, Ted Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Dr. Spock, Crime, the Kerner Report, Joe Namath, plus a chapter devoted to the famous Gore Vidal confrontation. Retail Value: $1.50.*

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candor and clarity of judgment which the public has a right to expect in a high public official." And so, virtually by elimination, Muskie.

For once, however, the Harris poll—*Harris!*—brings cold comfort to Democrats. Teddy is a) the most popular candidate among Democrats, but b) as of now would be slaughtered by Nixon in every section of the country except the liberal Northeast, a sort of electoral Biafra. Maybe that is what General Gavin's "enclave theory" was all about.

Senator Proxmire Tells Almost All

You're altogether out of it this season if you can't produce a few classified government documents (see the balance of this issue!) and Senator William Proxmire has never been one to miss the latest fashion. So there he was with the reporters the other day, holding in his hand the country-by-country list of military-assistance figures for the new fiscal year, as proposed by the Administration but not yet acted on by Congress. This document he possessed as a member (and chairman) of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. In past years only the total figure has been made public during congressional consideration; the detailed breakdown has been released only after legislative action has been completed. The reason for this prior restraint would seem fairly sensible. Before the vote, individual grants are subject to amendment, and are in fact frequently amended, usually in committee. Bringing the detailed list into the open before Congress has acted means that various of the recipient nations will make invidious comparisons and no doubt press to lift their quotas or lower the quotas of countries they dislike—a process that does not make for orderly and friendly diplomacy in a matter that is delicate enough to begin with.

Still, compared to some disclosures we could mention, the damage this one might do is no doubt relatively slight—though we are practically bound to get some dreary Philippics on the criminal military-industrial plot to shore up reactionary Military Dictatorships: In fact, Vance Hartke has already started thundering against aid to Greece. Running our eye down the list, we were struck by the omission of one country that we gather ranks rather high on the receiving end. Checking, we learned that, indeed, Senator Proxmire "had withheld aid figures" for Israel as well as the minor figures for other nearby Middle Eastern countries. Senator Proxmire explained his classification: In connection with the Middle East, "delicate negotiations are now under way." It's good to know that the countergovernment, too, has its Top Secrets.

Rugby Down Under

In Sydney, where the beer's supreme
And leggy girls abound,
South Africa took on their team
And beat them to the ground.
It wasn't losing massively
That got them so up-tight;
They didn't knee illegally—
They are, however, white.
From pulpit to politico
The controversy raged,
All breathing heavily to show
They could not be upstaged.
Perhaps they know what they're about,
But what is one to think?
They lust to throw the racists out,
Yet won't let in one Chink.

W. H. VON DREELE

Notes & Asides

■ Although we do not doubt that it was unintentional, the display advertisements published in the preceding (July 13) issue of NATIONAL REVIEW for the book *American Statesmen on Slavery and the Negro* gave the impression that the book was invidious to the Negro people. The advertisement was not seen beforehand by the publisher or any of the editors of NATIONAL REVIEW, all of whom regret its publication, while making no judgment against the motives of the authors or the publishers. —WFB

Just in Case You Wondered, Thomas

1. *Firing Line*, Buckley *v.* McCloskey, May 26.

MR. MCCLOSKEY. On the night of April 13, at a dinner with Mr. Stearns [of USIA, in Vientiane, Laos], we asked, "Have you made any surveys of refugee attitudes?" The specific response was "No, we haven't made any studies because we don't have adequate staff to do so." . . . The next day we were given a copy of a survey —not by his choice—but because we walked into his office with a man who said the survey did exist, and he then produced the survey. The night before . . .

MR. BUCKLEY. The survey was in your briefcase, Mr. McCloskey. It was given to you a week before, but you didn't bother to look at it.

MR. MCCLOSKEY. No, that was not correct.

MR. BUCKLEY. Well, the guy who gave it to you told me that he did.

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MR. MCCLOSKEY. Who told you that?

MR. BUCKLEY. Somebody. (LAUGHTER FROM AUDIENCE)

MR. MCCLOSKEY. If you will identify his name, we will find out what he told you; because I am telling you, you are not telling me the truth.

MR. BUCKLEY. Well, I am telling you the truth so far as I know it.

MR. MCCLOSKEY. I am telling you right now, Mr. Buckley, nobody told you that he gave me that report a week earlier. Let me tell you the truth, and I expect you to believe me. Nobody gave me that report at any time until the day I went into that Embassy on April 14.

ABC *Issues and Answers*, May 30, 1971

MR. MCCLOSKEY. We found then on their desk the next day a report that the bombing of 96 villages, or 76—

MR. CLARK. You found this on a desk in the State Department?

MR. MCCLOSKEY. Well, we got it, finally, off the desk, for the time being.

MR. GILL. Weren't you actually given a summary of a report that you later received, and didn't you have that with you when you went to Laos, concerning the bombing and the refugee problems?

MR. MCCLOSKEY. Let me describe the circumstances. Before I went to Laos on April 1, a member of the State Department gave us a four-page summary, gave it to a member of my staff, John Wilson, who put it in a briefing book I took to Laos with me. . . .

The next morning I went through my briefing book. I found this reference, this summary of the report.

2. *Firing Line*, Buckley *v.* Dellums, June 15.

MR. BUCKLEY. When you mentioned the necessity for a civilized discourse, I agree with you. Which makes it perplexing why in the course of your campaign you referred to Mr. Agnew as a "nervous adder" spreading a "near-Nazi ideology," and referred to his speeches as a "blueprint for genocide and political repression."

MR. DELLUMS. The fact of the matter is I didn't make that statement.

MR. BUCKLEY. Oh, well, it was in your campaign literature. I mean, I take your word for it that you didn't. You were quoted as saying it.

Daily Californian, October 12, 1970: "Berkeley Councilman Ronald V. Dellums, Democratic candidate for Congress here, charged at a news conference Friday that Vice President Spiro Agnew was a 'nervous adder,' spreading a 'near-Nazi ideology.' Dellums termed Agnew's recent campaign speeches a 'blueprint for genocide and political repression' (that) 'may well be designed by the President of the United States.' "

3. *Firing Line*, Buckley *v.* Kunstler, June 24.

MR. BUCKLEY. Well, now, when you said in Chicago, "You must learn to fight in the streets, learn to revolt, learn to shoot guns," you meant shoot them into the air, is that it?

MR. KUNSTLER. I don't think I said that in Chicago.

MR. BUCKLEY. Well, do you remember *where* you said it?

MR. KUNSTLER. I think it's wrong. I don't remember *ever* saying a statement like that. . . . That's Tom Hayden's speech at Chicago, as I recall—I think it's Tom Hayden's recorded speech played during the trial —Yes, I think if you attribute this to me, it should be mine.

MR. BUCKLEY. Well, all right, I agree with you.

Human Events, July 25, 1970: "At New York's Law School [Kunstler] told students: 'You must learn to fight in the streets, learn to revolt, learn to shoot guns. . . . You may ultimately have to take that final step. You may ultimately be bathed in blood. So will others. But you will have to do it.' "

(LAUGHTER FROM WFB) **—WFB**


LOP-SIDED
JUST BECAUSE I AGREE WITH EVERYTHING THEY SAY DOESN'T MEAN I'M NOT AN INDEPENDENT THINKER! DON'T YOU KNOW ABOUT THE LONG ARM OF COINCIDENCE?
NEWS COVERAGE

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The Missing Memoranda
1962-1966

THE SECRET PAPERS They Didn't Publish

The Makers of the Indochina War:

Strategy and counter-strategy from highly classified documents not published by the New York Times *and the* Washington Post, *leaked to* NATIONAL REVIEW

October 1964: The Air Force and the CIA: Who Says A, Must Say B

In early September, 1964, President Johnson appointed a special inter-departmental, inter-agency committee, referred to as OVERLOOK, to review the record of US activities in, and in relation to, Indochina from 1950 (the date of US recognition of Bao Dai, the first active intervention in the Indochinese conflict). The committee was instructed to submit its report and conclusions to the NSC prior to the end of the month, in conjunction with the new policy directives under discussion and due for decision in the first week of October. It was the normal practice of such committees, special or standing, as it was of the NSC, JCS, etc., to reach final agreement on a single report through discussion and, when necessary, compromise of any divergencies in viewpoint. In the case of OVERLOOK, however, two members—not named, but identified as from the Air Force and CIA—declined to endorse the report, and insisted on submitting a "minority" document, not so much disagreeing with the approved text as adding a further section. It is not clear whether this appendix was ever actually placed before the NSC or seen by the President.

1. As in numerous other reports, memoranda and recommendations drawn up since 1951 for JCS, NSC, SD, the President, various ad hoc committees, etc., the report of OVERLOOK fails to accept the implications of its own data and analysis, and therefore cannot serve as a correct guide for policy and plans.

2. From 1950 on, the nature and significance of US interest in Southeast Asia have been repeatedly stated, without essential dispute. E.g.:

Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy, 8 Nov 1961: ". . . The Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatrick and I . . . are inclined to recommend that we do commit the United States to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military action. . . . If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. . . ."

Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy, 11 Nov 1961:

a) UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

. . . The loss of South Vietnam to

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Communism would involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc. The loss of South Vietnam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation with the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Vietnam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty. . . .

October 1964: "The US accepted the commitment to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. To make good on that commitment, the JCS (and other relevant agencies) have periodically proposed military, para-military, political, psychological, etc. measures.

"Invariably the measures actually approved have been drastically scaled down, in both quantity and quality, from those proposed. In every case the reduced measures have failed to achieve the assigned objectives. This failure was predictable, and was in fact in a number of instances predicted, but no conclusion was ever drawn for future operations. On the contrary, the failures were rationalized, and the same process repeated at the next stage."

The loss of South Vietnam would not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of South Vietnam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration. . . .

b) THE UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communist [sic].

Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 13 Jan 1962; transmitted to President Kennedy 27 Jan without endorsement:

. . . MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS.

a. *Early Eventualities*—Loss of the Southeast Asian mainland would have an adverse impact on our military strategy and would markedly reduce our ability in limited war by denying us air, land and sea bases, by forcing greater intelligence effort with lesser results, by complicating military lines of communications and by the introduction of more formidable enemy forces in the area. Air access and access to 5,300 miles of mainland coastline would be outflanked, the last significant United Kingdom military strength in Asia would be eliminated with the loss of Singapore and Malaya and United States military influence in that area, short of war, would be difficult to exert.

b. *Possible Eventualities*—Of equal importance to the immediate losses are the eventualities which could follow the loss of the Southeast Asian mainland. All of the Indonesian archipelago could come under the domination and control of the USSR and would become a Communist base posing a threat to Australia and New Zealand. The Sino-Soviet bloc would have control of the eastern access to the Indian Ocean. The Philippines and Japan could be pressured to assume, at best, a neutralist role, thus eliminating two of our major bases in the Western Pacific. Our lines of defense then would be pulled north to Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan, resulting in the subsequent overtaking of our lines of communications in a limited war. India's ability to remain neutral would be jeopardized and, as the bloc meets success, its concurrent stepped-up activities to move into and control Africa can be expected. . . .

A memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson on "South Vietnam," 16 Mar 1964, and an NSC Action Memorandum (22) on "United States Objectives in South Vietnam," 17 Mar 1964, restate the analysis and objectives, and stress the added fact that the United States commitment to date "accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of United States capacity to help a nation to meet the Communist 'war of liberation.'"

"The enemy will be able to adjust and adapt to our incremental escalation, no matter how high an absolute level it reached, so long as the pressure is increased only by slow and gradual steps. . . ."

3. Based on these premises, the US accepted the commitment to prevent a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. To make good on that commitment, the JCS (and other relevant agencies) has periodically proposed military, paramilitary, political, psychological, etc. measures.

4. Invariably the measures actually approved have been drastically scaled down, in both quantity and quality, from those proposed. In every case the reduced measures have failed to achieve the assigned objectives. This failure was predictable, and was in fact in a number of instances predicted, but no conclusion was ever drawn for future operations. On the contrary, the failures were rationalized, and the same process repeated at the next stage.

5. What has been at issue here has been, at bottom, a basic conflict between two strategic concepts: a) the strategy of what the Secretary of Defense has termed "graduated response," or what might be designated "incremental escalation"; b) the strategy of

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AFTR—Technical Research Vessel
ARVN—Army of (South) Vietnam
Chicom—Communist China
CINCPAC—Commander in Chief, Pacific
CPC—Communist Party of China
DD—Destroyer
DRV—Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam
ELINT—Electronic Interceptor
GNVN—Government of (North) Vietnam
GVN—Government of (South) Vietnam
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
LST—Landing Ship, Transport
MSF—Mine Sweeper, Fast
NRF—National Liberation Front (in South Vietnam)
NSC—National Security Council
NVN—North Vietnam
PRP—People's Revolutionary Party (in South Vietnam)
PTF—Patrol Boat, Fast
P3-A—Patrol Aircraft
SD—Secretary of Defense
SEA—South East Asia
SS—Submarine
SU—Soviet Union
SVN—South Vietnam
S2—Anti Submarine
WESTPAC—Commander in Chief, West Pacific

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what the JCS has termed "the sharp knock," or what might be designated "quantum escalation."

6. The strategy of graduated response has been followed, in practice, to date. It has failed at each stage to achieve its immediate or promote its longer-term objective, and is thus proved deficient by experience. Its inadequacy can readily be demonstrated by general considerations. As the JCS has pointed out, the slowly increasing pressures of the "graduated response" strategy deprive the US of the military effects on the enemy of surprise and shock, and enable him to adjust to the slow quantitative and qualitative increase of pressure. There is no reason to predict that this situation could change in the foreseeable future. The enemy will be able to adjust and adapt to our incremental escalation, no matter how high an absolute level is reached, so long as the pressure is increased only by slow and gradual steps.

"The internal conflict cannot be resolved without knocking NVN out of the war."

7. The liquidation of internal conflict in SVN, and the consolidation of a viable, self-sufficient non-Communist regime able to stand on its own feet politically, militarily, and economically is necessarily a long-term process (cf. Malaya). It does not, however, require a major American military presence. But the internal conflict cannot be resolved without knocking NVN out of the war, since it is NVN (with the backing and support of the USSR and the Chicoms) that commands and controls the internal SVN struggle, and is the primary source of arms, supplies, training, regroupment, and, to an increasing extent, personnel. To succeed in the long-term task of the liquidation of the internal subversion, NVN must be compelled to stop, or reduce to a minimum level, its intervention in the south. This can be done only by a "sharp knock" or succession of knocks delivered with a force and suddenness to which NVN cannot adjust and adapt, and which will present the GNVN with a prospect in face of which it will choose to give up its objective of taking over SVN, in preference to risking its own destruction.

"Demonstration drop of nuclear device . . . followed by use of nuclear bombs and devices where militarily suitable."

8. The conclusion follows that the US must abandon the strategy of graduated response and shift to the "sharp knock" (quantum escalation) strategy in relation to NVN. This will mean adoption of one or more, as necessary and in rapid succession, of the sharply escalated measures that have been proposed and studied, and for which contingency plans have long existed. E.g.:

a) Closing of Haiphong and Sihanoukville harbors, and blockade of NVN and Cambodian coast.

b) Rapid destruction of all NVN thermal power installations.

c) Destruction of rail lines linking NVN and China.

d) Destruction of Red River dikes and irrigation systems, thus of primary NVN food source.

e) Neutralization of Hainan.

f) Demonstration drop of nuclear device, as projected (cf. memorandum from Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman JCS, to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, 26 May 1954, and supporting exhibits), followed by use of nuclear bombs and devices where militarily suitable, if GNVN does not respond. . . .

9. It is of the essence of the proposed strategic shift that each operation should be massive and concentrated, to ensure a maximum psychological as well as physical effect.

10. The objective with respect to NVN would be constantly and publicly reiterated: that NVN end its intervention in SVN. It would be made clear that US operations against NVN (and NVN personnel in SVN) would cease as soon as the GNVN agreed to end the intervention, or showed in action that it was bringing the intervention to an end. There is every reason to assume that this objective so stated will present US policy in the most favorable form from the point of view of most other nations.

11. The course and nature of the conflict demonstrate that the US can achieve its declared objective only by adoption of a strategic approach along the lines herein proposed, which are moreover in keeping with US combat tradition. This has been recognized by many for some while, especially within the military and intelligence structures. There remains to draw the final, and logically inescapable, conclusion: that if, for whatever reason, it is decided to be paramountly undesirable to adopt such a strategy—and therefore as a consequence impossible to achieve our objective—the US should renounce its commitment in Southeast Asia, and withdraw as rapidly as is physically possible.

"If, for whatever reason, it is decided to be paramountly undesirable to adopt such a strategy the US should renounce its commitment in Southeast Asia, and withdraw as rapidly as is physically possible."

December 1964: That Resistance in Vietnam Be Projected As Part of a Global Strategy, Or It Will Be Rejected by Our Allies

This planning memorandum, originating in the office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security, was circulated by the Secretary of Defense to a number of high-ranking officials in the Pentagon, in the last week of December, 1964.

TO: OSD
FROM: ISA

RE: International repercussions of projected overt armed intervention in SVN

1. The public meaning of US armed intervention in VN can be established only in a global rather than a merely regional context. Whatever we say or do will be interpreted by the world either as a US betrayal of one of its

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allies, or as a US act of aggression, or, alternatively, as an act of loyalty to treaty obligations and a justified reaction to Communist aggression.

2. The global context is established by two historical facts: the global nature of the Communist threat, and the global system of Free World defenses against it. The Communist threat is global because the Communists speak and think of their ultimate goal in terms of all mankind; also because each nation falling victim to Communist expansion is seen by other nations not as having been brought into this or that sphere of regional influence but rather as having been subjected to totalitarian dictatorship. This fate is understood by all other still free nations as one potentially threatening them, too, so that any particular Communist takeover is experienced by all free nations as a bell that tolls also for them.

3. In response to Communist aggression, the US and its allies have created a system of treaties, both collective and bilateral, of which SEATO is an integral part. While the treaties are not made legally dependent on each other, they are linked by the common factor of political stamina that results from the US commitment to the defense of nations exposed to Communist invasion and subversion. The prospect of US help enables each of these exposed countries to sustain its will to be free rather than to hop on the Communist bandwagon "while there is still time." If any of the exposed nations felt it necessary to look on future Communist rule as a foregone conclusion and reminded itself, either from observation or past experience, how hopeless is any internal opposition to an established totalitarian regime, a rapidly increasing number would hasten to join up today rather than tomorrow. In this interdependence of US commitment and the political stamina of exposed nations, the obligation of the US under the various defense treaties is like an international litmus paper: so long as the US stands by its obligations, the exposed countries will dare to feel secure; once the US fails an ally, the coloring of the paper will change, and every one of our allies will come to feel exposed, alone and ultimately doomed.

4. US global resistance to Communist expansion stems not from an arrogant desire to play policeman all over the world but from the simple calculation that not only our national security but also world peace are bound up with the resistance of the exposed nations to Communism. Each new nation to fall under Communist rule swells the total resources at the disposal of that enterprise. Czechoslovakia is today Soviet-occupied, which means that its arms and machines go wherever Moscow desires them to go. If Europe and Southeast Asia should fall under Communist control, the Communist bloc's power resources would so overbalance ours that our hope for survival would come to rest wholly in the potential use of our nuclear weapons.

"Since 1963 we have followed a policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, and have in fact projected a significant distinction between Asian Communism and Russian Communism. If we were to continue this line, we would bar ourselves from presenting the conflict in Vietnam as part of a global threat of Communism and our own action as an integral element in a global system of resistance to Communist expansion. To engage in military action in what would then appear as a purely 'Asian' war would mean to risk not only the loss of the only justification for our action, but also the rise of a hostile 'Asianism' resenting our 'white' presence there."

5. If SVN should be allowed to fall to Communist insurgency while we are present but merely looking on, the first countries to draw obvious conclusions for themselves would be the divided ones, Germany and Korea. The effect of that event in SEA has been designated the "domino theory." That term suggests something like an automatic or mechanical effect of the fall of SVN on its neighbors. Actually, the effect would consist of a radical re-assessment of the world situation and of the chance of anti-Communist resistance in areas contiguous to Communist-dominated territory, setting in motion strong psychological and political forces favoring a yielding to Communism as the "wave of the future." This effect would not be confined to SEA but would also occur in Europe, the northern tier of the Middle East, and even in parts of LA. One could expect NATO's seams to loosen or even burst; all other parts of our alliance system would be critically examined by our allies, with a strong disposition to pull out and look for alternative shelters.

6. If, on the other hand, we intervene massively in Vietnam, given the global context of our commitments, repercussions may result from the geopolitical character of this particular theater which might be looked upon as the wrong place. One could expect that some of our NATO allies, who rallied strongly in view of the fall of Czechoslovakia, would not consider the fall of SVN as a direct threat and would take a dim view of our action there. They might even conclude that our commitment in SEA takes away from the attention we can give to European security.

7. The same considerations would have applied to Korea. In that case, we obtained not only the consent but the active participation of a goodly part of our allies. We succeeded in this because we based our intervention in Korea not on regional strategic motivations but on global ones: both the global threat of Communism, and also the desire, within the UN framework of collective security, to punish "aggression" in the abstract. The Korean experience should warn us not to present the conflict in Vietnam in a mere regional context but continuously to emphasize its global significance. In a merely regional context, our intervention there would also look to many as if it were an act of imperialism.

8. It follows that the most important

"In this interdependence of US commitment and the political stamina of exposed nations, the obligation of the US under the various defense treaties is like an international litmus paper: so long as the US stands by its obligations, the exposed countries will dare to feel secure; once the US fails an ally, the coloring of the paper will change, and every one of our allies will come to feel exposed, alone and ultimately doomed."

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repercussion of our intervention in Vietnam is bound to occur in our own relations with the Soviet Union. Since 1963 we have followed a policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, and have in fact projected a significant distinction between Asian Communism and Russian Communism. If we were to continue this line, we would bar ourselves from presenting the conflict in Vietnam as part of a global threat of Communism and our own action as an integral element in a global system of resistance to Communist expansion. To engage in military action in what would then appear as a purely "Asian" war would mean to risk not only the loss of the only justification for our action, but also the rise of a hostile "Asianism" resenting our "white" presence there.

December 1964: An Eminent Private Citizen Is Consulted: Keep Your Eyes on the Soviet Union

Private Communication to the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, signed "DA" (Dean Acheson?).

December 14, 1964

The honor of being asked for my opinion on an overt military intervention in Vietnam with combat units is highly appreciated. I am returning the classified documents and other materials which you so kindly put at my disposal. You could not expect me to pass on the military aspects of the projected policy. I shall confine my remarks to a few ideas about the political aspects.

1. The military potential of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces is bound to remain small except for outside aid. The Chicoms can supply light weapons, food and some fuel. Most substantial aid would come from the Soviet Union. Without Soviet help our operations could be kept in a very low key.

2. Soviet aid alone could raise the level of warfare to the point where both its scope and duration would turn into a problem of first magnitude, both internationally and on the homefront. Our relations with the Soviet Union and our chances of minimizing Soviet aid to North Vietnam are therefore of vital importance in the entire picture.

3. Since 1963 we have been engaged on a course of accommodation with the Soviet Union, to the point where we have accorded quite differential treatment to Communism in Russia as distinct from Communism in China. We have publicly stated that the Cold War is ended and that we consider the Soviet Union a power wholly committed to the cause of peace.

4. If we were to engage our military forces in Vietnam and at the same time to cling to this line of accommodation with the SU, we would find ourselves in an extremely weak diplomatic position vis-à-vis Soviet aid to Vietnam. We would be compelled practically to ignore that aid and would be deprived of diplomatic leverage for its reduction.

5. Even more serious consequences could result on the homefront, and in relations with our European and Asian allies. If we make a significant distinction between Communism of Moscow and Communism of Peiping, and call the first one our friend and the second our enemy, the impression must result that in Vietnam we are not fighting Communism but rather China, or, what is even worse, the Liberation forces of Vietnam. It will be impossible then to make sense of this war, for we have no urgent direct national interests that would bid us go to war against Vietnam, or even China. Vietnam, like Korea, is a far-away place, and the only way in which US armed intervention there can be justified is in terms of the global threat of Communism.

"My considered opinion is that as long as we are unwilling to discontinue the policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, we should not involve our forces in overt fighting in Vietnam. . . . We should put the blame for a breakdown of the pattern of agreements and cooperation on the shoulder of the Soviet Union and hold out the prospect of returning to that pattern in the same measure in which Soviet aid to Vietnam will be reduced."

6. If we continue the course of accommodation with the Soviet Union, we would also feel ourselves inhibited from taking military steps that would keep Soviet aid from reaching North Vietnamese forces, e.g. closing ports of entry to Soviet ships.

7. My considered opinion is that as long as we are unwilling to discontinue the policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union, we should not involve our forces in overt fighting in Vietnam.

8. If the decision, however, should be made in favor of overt intervention in Vietnam, I urge very strongly that we make it clear to the Soviet Union that we are doing so in response to a Communist violation of the status quo in SEA, that we would react with equal determination to a violation of the status quo in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere, and that we cannot have one policy in Europe and another in Asia. We should put the blame for a breakdown of the pattern of agreements and cooperation on the shoulder of the Soviet Union and hold out the prospect of returning to that pattern in the same measure in which Soviet aid to Vietnam will be reduced. As programs and policies adopted since 1962/3 are being dismantled one after the other, we should do this in close consultation with our NATO allies and with flanking operations in the UN.

9. The overriding purpose of this shift in our policy to the Soviet Union should be a double one: a) to minimize Soviet aid to Vietnam, and b) to keep before the eyes of the world and of our people the meaning of this war, which is the containment of Communist imperialism.

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July 1964: The Structure and the Objectives of the 'National Liberaiton Front'

Excerpt from Confidential Memorandum prepared by Douglas Pike and Frank Trager at the request of Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy, July, 1964.

1. The widespread impression exists that the conflict-process in Vietnam is a civil war on the traditional model among and/or between contending local factions. This is an illusion. Unless the fundamental novelty of the Vietnamese situation is understood, no general support for the war on the part of the American public can be anticipated. The authors of this memorandum would like to put particular stress on the factor of novelty.
2. The familiar term Viet Cong, a contraction of Viet Nam Cong San, meaning Vietnamese Communist, is imprecise. In itself, the term Viet Cong is a barrier to the understanding.
3. The so-called Viet Cong actually consists of three interlocking but distinct elements: 1) the People's Revolutionary Party, or Communist Party of Vietnam, 2) the Liberation Army and 3) the National Liberation Front, comprised of some twenty or more socio-political entities.
4. One aspect of the "novelty factor" concerns the history of the National Liberation Front, or NLF. Unlike previous "fronts," such as the Popular Front of the 1930s and '40s, the NLF structure came into being in 1960 before there were any entities for the "front" to, so to speak, front for. When it was founded on December 20, 1960 —incidentally, in Hanoi pursuant to a decision taken at the 15th meeting of the Lao Dong (Communist Party) Central Committee in May, 1959—it was correctly considered a phantom entity, existing only on paper. Gradually, however, the paper design was fleshed out.
5. A key factor in the fleshing out of the paper skeleton of the NLF was the announcement, early in 1960, of Soviet support for so-called "national wars of liberation." This meant that dissident factions within any underdeveloped nation would have maximum Soviet support when they could mount an insurgency. In effect, the policy of supporting "national wars of liberation" was a Soviet declaration of war against the US, in the sense that the Soviet Union was saying that it would employ its full military and political resources to upset the balance of power in vital sectors of the world.
6. Returning to Vietnam, the military-political thrust there must be fully understood. Let us take each of the three interlocking elements separately.
7. The National Liberation Front, or NLF, consists of administrative and functional elements.

a) The administrative structure is in essence an alternative government. It is hierarchical in nature, with the NLF Central Committee at the apex. Lines of command run down through intervening administrative committees to administrative groups operative at the village level. This is the administrative central nervous system of the National Liberation Front.

"A key factor in the fleshing out of the paper skeleton of the NLF was the announcement, early in 1960, of Soviet support for so-called 'national wars of liberation.' . . . In effect, the policy of supporting 'national wars of liberation' was a Soviet declaration of war against the US."

b) The functional units comprise such groups as the Workers' Liberation Association, the Women's Liberation Association, the Youth Liberation Association, the Student Liberation Association, the Cultural Liberation Association (school teachers. librarians, etc.), the Patriotic and Democratic Journalists' Association, as well as externally-oriented groups such as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee. This structure is disciplined and subject to tight control by the NLF Central Committee.
8. Until January, 1962 the Communist Party of South Vietnam was known as the Southern Branch of the Vietnam Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong). At that time it changed its name to the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, with tighter organizational control by the DRV Communist hierarchy in Hanoi. The PRP is not the only political element in the NLF, but it is the dominant one. The PRP is described as "the soul" of the NLF, the "engine of the revolution," the "vanguard." It has "fraternal ties" with Communist parties elsewhere.
9. The NLF, dominated by the PRP, thus constitutes a partly indigenous southern structure, an alternative government, with chain-of-command relations to the DRV hierarchy in the North.
10. The Liberation Army of the NLF consists of two elements, a Full Military Force and a Paramilitary Force. The former is usually referred to as the Main Force, sometimes as the "hard hats" (because of the fibre-board Viet Minh helmets worn), and consists of some 75-80,000 regular troops. The Paramilitary Force, or guerrillas, about three times that number, is comprised of both men and women. The Paramilitary Force itself consists of two types of guerrilla: a) the classic guerrilla band, operating in a remote area, and b) the Local Guerrilla, a part-time fighter who may work by day and carry out guerrilla actions at night.
11. The objective of all three elements described above is political power. The political goals are identical to those of Communist parties elsewhere. The NLF is most accurately understood not as an indigenous South Vietnamese phenomenon but as an administrative arm of the DRV extending itself South through political-military pressure and organization.
12. NLF popularity was at its pinnacle in 1962-63, but since that time has dropped precipitously. NLF village cadres have increasingly exhibited paranoiac behavior with regard to the possible presence of "spies." Prisoners freed by allied troops from NLF jails have told harrowing stories of "justice" in the villages. Villagers can now be shot on the spot according to NLF

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directives. The villagers resent the "thought reform sessions," the increasing tax levies and the conscripting of young men into the Liberation Army. Of local supporters of the NLF, it is certain that a very high proportion should be classified as unwilling supporters. The secret of continuing NLF strength in the countryside is efficient organization, plus the poor communications with the central government characteristic of Vietnamese society at its present stage of development.

13. No certainty exists as to how the NLF would behave if it succeeded in wresting power from the Saigon government. Based on its current administrative structure, it would be expected to establish a totalitarian structure closely linked with that of DRV. Based on experience elsewhere, a struggle might be anticipated within the emerging NLF regime between guerrilla elements, or some of them, and the central apparatus. Given the disposition of power within the PRP, dissident guerrillas and other dissident elements might be expected to lose this struggle. The central apparatus would have the political and military backing of the DRV government in Hanoi.

"NLF village cadres have increasingly exhibited paranoiac behavior with regard to the possible presence of 'spies.' Prisoners freed by allied troops from NLF jails have told harrowing stories of 'justice' in the villages. Villagers can now be shot on the spot according to NLF directives."

14. The authors of this memorandum would now like to move beyond the descriptive into the projective.

a) Clearly, the first question must be: What will be the fate of the non-Communist government of South Vietnam if the United States does nothing? The answer here is plain. The established NLF organization, controlled by the Communist North and backed by the Soviet Union and Communist China, will make the country ungovernable. The techniques for accomplishing this are well-known.

b) Suppose the United States pursues the course of protracted conflict, shoring up the Saigon regime, but at the same time providing enough muscle for the Saigon regime to make significant progress against the NLF?

It must be clear here that the DRV can match US input in such a way as to neutralize it. Diversionary attacks will be carried out at various points to tie down the US forces. Meanwhile, the protracted conflict will be inconclusive.

15. From the above, one conclusion seems inescapable. The conflict in the South cannot be successfully concluded unless the North is definitively prevented from sustaining its political and/or military structure in the South.

August 1966: A Former Ambassador Reminds the Secretary of State Of the Historical Uses of National Liberation Fronts

Private letter from Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, Ambassador to Vietnam 1957-1961, to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, dated August 10, 1966.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Our presence in Vietnam and our commitment to the objective of keeping South Vietnam from falling to the Communists are continuously assailed by the charge that we are in fact preventing a people from achieving its unity and the National Liberation Front from carrying out an essentially patriotic job. Is there no way of making clear to the world that national liberation is a cause that Communists have exploited repeatedly to establish their rule?

You know that in Vietnam two movements for gaining national liberty have existed since the early Thirties: one Communist and the other nationalist. You remember, of course, that during the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia there also emerged Mihailovich and Tito, a genuinely nationalist and a Communist liberation movement; in that case, the British and we backed the wrong horse, as it turned out later. At present, the Communists still maintain sleeper liberation movements in Malaysia and the Philippines, after the nationalistic forces beat them in the struggles of the Fifties. Incidentally, a specially instructive case is Byelorussia, where the Communists first created a national liberation movement, then got into power with the help of it, and finally crushed it with much bloodshed. It seems that national liberation is a game in which many players can participate, and with different motives. The actual term "National Liberation Front" seems to have been the exclusive property of Communist organizations in Greece, Yemen, Venezuela and other places.

"A specially instructive case is Byelorussia, where the Communists first created a national liberation movement, then got into power with the help of it, and finally crushed it with much bloodshed."

The Communists have long ago embraced the principle that there are certain "holy" causes to which people will flock, and that these causes can and must be put at the service of the Communist strategy. Since 1949, they have skillfully exploited the "peace" movement. Even earlier, they put the strong pulling power of "anti-fascism" before their wagon, and "national liberation" as well as the peasants' hunger for land have been their special mounts ever since Lenin's days.

A Communist-run National Liberation Front is nothing but a special branch of Communist military, paramilitary and administrative machinery that uses and misuses the patriotism of honest people for its ultimate partisan purposes.

In this day of "accommodation" with the Soviet Union, has it become diplomatically impossible to remind the world of these truths?

Sincerely yours,
Elbridge Durbrow

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June 1964: A Summary of What Is To Be Expected from the Soviet Union

Memorandum of Special CIA Task Force on Soviet Posture in the event of US Armed Intervention in SVN.

(Requested by White House in May, 1964. Delivered and filed June 12.)

SUMMARY

Probable reaction of SU to open military intervention by US armed forces in SVN:

1. The Soviet Union presently operates under the strategy formulated by various Party documents published in November, 1957, December, 1960, and November, 1961 (Tab. I). These documents contain the Party's official appraisal of the world situation and strategic directives for the present period. They resemble similar documents previously adopted in 1920, 1928, 1935, each of which was held binding until the adoption of its successor.

2. The present strategy commits the SU to avoiding an all-out nuclear conflict with the West, also to avoiding "local wars" which might lead to a general conflict, but on the other hand to taking "a most positive attitude" toward "national liberation wars" and "popular uprisings." (Khrushchev's speech, Jan. 6, 1961, Tab. II.) This pattern, called "peaceful co-existence," is meant to be accompanied by sharply intensified "ideological struggle." It envisages great internal tensions and pressures occasioned in Western countries by ongoing "national liberation wars" and looks on them as opportunities for Communists to enter into coalitions with Social Democrats, pacifists, progressive and liberal forces, and others generally opposed to present Western policies, and through such coalitions to obtain control of this or that Western government.

3. The strategy thus has a military and a political dimension, the latter being a design to help Communists achieve what they call "peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism," which in turn depends on Communist governmental control attained without the cost of civil war. The takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 has convinced Soviet leadership that the way into governmental power with the help of a general leftist coalition is feasible and in general the surest way to a Communist triumph. They are not likely to jeopardize their great expectations in this regard for anything less than an international emergency.

4. The Soviet Union might break this entire policy pattern if it were faced by a direct military or political threat to its home base. Overt US intervention in Vietnam, however, will rather confirm the Soviet adherence to the present strategy. Not even a US military victory in SEA is likely to provoke the Soviet Union to a direct nuclear threat against the US, or to the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Vietnam theater.

5. The resort to serious diversions (Berlin? Middle East? LA?) would lie athwart the main line of the new strategy which aims to make Communists acceptable to potential coalition partners. One may assume, therefore, that even in the presence of overt US military action in VN, the Soviets will be disposed to play the game of "accommodation" as they have done since 1962/3.

6. One should assume that for reasons of political exploitation Moscow is interested in the longest possible duration of a war in VN. The SU is likely to furnish Hanoi with substantial arms, escalating its aid proportionately to the rise of our military pressures, and enabling Hanoi to go beyond guerrilla warfare to "stage III"—conventional warfare—which according to Maoist principles is alone suitable for bringing a war to a victorious conclusion.

7. Only a war of long duration will enable Soviet propaganda to exploit the situation fully with a view to the eventual developments of domestic politics mentioned under (2). The goal of a Soviet propaganda campaign of long duration would be to identify the US government and its allies in SVN with imperialism, racism, militarism, fascism and aggression, and to alienate the US government from the people.

8. The Sino-Soviet conflict will contribute to keeping Soviet aid to the DRV vigorous but inconclusive. A DRV victory attributable mainly to Chinese help can be as little in Moscow's interest as a DRV defeat attributable to insufficient Soviet aid. Moscow is presently in no position to deny Peiping strong influence in the area and, for ideological reasons, will not withhold a certain amount of practical cooperation with China, in regard to the DRV.

June 1964: A Summary of What Is To Be Expected from Communist China

Memorandum of Special CIA Task Force on Chicom Posture in event of US Armed Intervention in SVN.

(Requested by White House in May, 1964. Delivered and filed June 7.)

SUMMARY

1. China intervened in the second phase of the Korean war when the North Korean army was on the point of being annihilated; her intervention eventually served to save North Korea and establish the cease-fire line near the 38th parallel. It should be assumed that China is likely to intervene directly in the Vietnam war only if and when the forces of the DRV are on the point of total defeat.

2. Even then, the situation now is

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not what it was in 1951. Internal events in China have put severe limitations on the regime's ability for external action:

a) The CPC is deeply split between the adherents of Mao and the regular Party apparatus; Mao, who still has charismatic leadership, has nevertheless been put on a siding.

b) Widespread disaffection prevails in the countryside as evidenced by the 29 issues of *Kung-tso T'ung hsün* (the *Red Army Bulletin*) which recently fell into our hands (Tab. I).

c) The Sino-Soviet split compels the Peiping regime to count on the possibility of a military conflict with the Soviet Union, which automatically puts a two-front prospect on any military venture in the South.

d) Chinese production has been distorted and severely set back by the "great leap forward."

e) Peiping has reflected its awareness of all of these limitations in a stance of great caution, as evidenced by her reticence in the Indian war, and vis-à-vis Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

3. The Chicoms are obviously interested in a protracted duration of any war in Vietnam in which the US would be involved. China will seek to keep this war going by a steady flow of substantial supplies, short of committing her own forces to a potential clash with US armed forces. China would draw advantages from a long war not only as she exploited the war in a propaganda campaign against the US, but also in the weakening of Hanoi and Hanoi's increasing dependence on China. The dependence could not be greater if Chinese troops were dispatched to the DRV since these troops would rather awaken the Vietnamese memory of past Chinese domination.

4. The likelihood of a Chinese commitment of troops to the SVN theater is further reduced because of the flanking threat from Taiwan, to which Chicom communications and transport lines would be exposed, especially when the US Seventh Fleet and Okinawa-based aircraft and installations are taken into account.

December 1963: The CIA Makes Psychological Assessments, Advises against 'LTW'

11 December 1963

TO: Secretary of Defense
Pentagon

FROM: Head,
Division of Psychological Assessment
CIA

RE: Psychological Evaluation of Warfare Involvement in Southeast Asia

BACKGROUND:
The US has a treaty obligation in Indochina. The wisdom of the commitment rests on the belief that US security interests, global and in the Pacific, will be gravely threatened if the US does not maintain a policy of containment. If the Administration holds this is no longer true, we recommend all troops and advisors be withdrawn from Vietnam. If this belief is still held, we emphatically recommend immediate massive escalation of the war effort. While it is not our function to prepare the form this will take militarily, it is our duty to advise on the psychological consequences of war on both the Vietnamese people as well as on the American public. These we feel will prove critical.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
The psychological warfare division recommends Short Term Warfare (STW) which will reduce loss of life for both the US, the ARVN, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. Long Term Warfare (LTW) will yield a no-win posture, thousands of deaths, and will have serious effects on our, as well as Saigon's, political institutions.

DISCUSSION:
A. *Effects on Vietnamese*

Long Term Warfare (LTW): The Vietnamese have already been subjected to a prolonged conflict. Killing, pillage and all the rest is already a commonplace occurrence. Yet, the conflicts to date are small in size and specific in damage. They have in a sense adapted to this continuing nuisance.

LTW with continual American troop and armory movements, bombing, search and destroy missions will have a disastrous effect on the Vietnamese population. At the present the alternatives for allegiance for the Vietnamese farmers are not compelling. The Viet Cong demands are contrary to their traditional values, and the Saigon government has not been convincing in its agrarian programs. In the long run troop movements criss-crossing this population will only find the Viet Cong ahead, if not by assent then by terror. Additionally, of course, there will be a great toll on the landscape and environmental resources of the country if LTW takes place.

"Long Term Warfare (LTW) will yield a no-win posture, thousands of deaths, and will have serious effects on our, as well as Saigon's, political institutions. . . . Gradual, slow escalation of the war over a period of years does not create in the Vietnamese people a sense of purpose or destiny. It will only create horror and depression. . . . The Administration should not start the Vietnamese operations if they see the war as an LTW affair."

More specifically, the threat or presence of war has obvious ill effects on a population. For those who understand the ideological issues and are committed to them, the war is viewed as a necessary evil and the concomitant tragedies are endured with relatively little psychological harm. Clearly, this is a relatively small part of the Vietnamese population. The majority live with a day-to-day philosophy and passively accept and prefer peace and quiet as a way of life over freedom. Prolonged war will alienate this population and tend to make them incorrigible. Also the ravages of war will tend to disrupt this segment of the population more than any other.

Short Term Warfare (12-24 months): The objective of war is to win and to do so as quickly and with as little loss

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of life, property and societal stability as possible. This objective can only be achieved by a quick "In and Out" move. Gradual, slow escalation of the war over a period of years does not create in the Vietnamese people a sense of purpose or destiny. It will only create horror and depression. With a quick and purposeful strike involving bombing and possible invasion of the North, the Vietnamese will respond with clarity and determination.

B. *American Public Opinion*

LTW: It would be an error to assume a protracted conflict in Southeast Asia would be supported by the American people. Any move on the part of the US will be criticized by a large vocal minority. This minority will grow with time, for it is in the nature of the American people to wish not to be or seem to be belligerent. When it appears there are ambiguities in our purpose (and this state of affairs will surely emerge in a war effort only abstractly involving American interests), public opinion will disengage their support gradually and completely.

It is the attitude of those about to go into the armed forces or of normally liberally minded youth which will turn aggressive. As their anxiety about the faceless war grows, their hostility towards the American government and its institutions will become more intense. They will observe they are acting aggressively towards their own government and its policies—an attitude that they are not historically comfortable with—and to explain these actions they will conclude that all government policy is bad and its officers corrupt and immoral. This kind of attitude development process is well understood, and it works like clockwork.

As a result the Administration should not start the Vietnamese operations if they see the war as an LTW affair.

STW: If the American public were prepared for the events in and around an STW operation they would overwhelmingly support the effort. Opinion would have to be shaped as carefully as it has been done in the past (See TOP SECRET-Sens. 1987439—ROSEVLT—WW2). There would still be serious criticism of the policy but it would remain minor if the entire event was over within 12 to 24 months.

September 1962: Consultant to CIA Examines US Antiwar Potential

The following memorandum ("Some Observations on the Psycho-Political Dimension of the Vietnam Conflict: Enemy Operations and Internal Dissidence"), dated 12 Sep 1962 and routed pro forma to the Director, CIA, was presumably prepared by a covert CIA consultant (not identified except through the designator 02.731).

1. Communist doctrine understands psycho-political operations to be a major weapons system, and potentially, at least in certain instances, the decisive weapons system. In the Vietnam conflict, the US has the capability of bringing to bear in the local theater an overwhelming preponderance of conventional—not to speak of nuclear—weapons. This fact dictates, for the Communists, a high priority for the psycho-political system, since in this capability the Communists possess superiority. In terms of total strategy, psycho-political operations offer the potential of outflanking the enemy, that is, the US.

2. It is with respect to psycho-political operations that the essentially global nature of the conflict is most unmistakably apparent. In routine day-by-day activities of the Communist-ruled nations and Communist organizations, there are divergences and disputes: cf., most conspicuously, the Sino-Soviet disputes, as well as the factional and ideological fissions between and in local Communist parties and front organizations. But in a struggle defined as against the leader of world imperialism, a united front of all Communist elements, governments as well as non-governmental organizations, automatically tends to sharpen up. The psycho-political campaign is, in sum, both global and unified. (A tight command structure and continuous liaison are not required, since the shared ideological foundations and historical goals assure, for the most part, a sufficient coordination.) The psycho-political campaign is carried forward by and from Moscow, Peiping, Warsaw, Havana, Hanoi and even Belgrade, together with all Communist parties and satellite organizations, Moscow-oriented, Trotskyite, Maoist, revisionist, adventurist, etc. This has been demonstrated throughout the past decade of comparatively low-profile struggle in Indochina, and will become more strikingly apparent when —as has become probable—the struggle is escalated.

3. From the point of view of Communist conflict management, psycho-political operations constitute one dimension or mode of their total war. Within their global framework, Indochina and territorial US are the chief active local theaters or fronts. The US thus should consider itself engaged in a two-front (in the larger and long-term sense, global) war. It is probable that the enemy regards territorial US as the main front.

4. Among primary objectives of Communist psycho-political operations are, and will be, the following:

a) *Global, long-term*: Weakening of the relative power position of the US; promotion of discords between US and other nations, especially allied nations; promotion of anti-US attitude in less developed nations; all as subordinate to long-term objective of defeat of US and thereby achievement of Communist global hegemony.

b) *Indochinese theater, specific*: Popularization of image of US as invading imperialist aggressor, anti-masses, anti-Asian, white racist, fascist, protector of local landlords, grafters and exploiters, etc.; presentation of Saigon government (so long as under anti-Communist leadership) as tool of US imperialism, corrupt, murderous, etc. (cf. current operation re President Diem); use of all opportune means to drive wedge between Saigon government and US; utilization of US personnel (civilian and military) as carriers, conscious or unconscious, of Communist psycho-political initiatives.

c) *US theater, long-term*: Utiliza-

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tion of Indochina conflict situation as opportunity to advance in long-term campaign to maximize potential fissions and splits within US social structure, and to promote division between government and people.

d) *US theater, specfic*: Maximum exploitation of antiwar sentiment, spontaneously present under the prevailing climate of opinion, in relation to a conflict of this nature (far-off, not obviously related to direct national interest, drawn-out and frustrating, etc.); transformation of antiwar sentiment into a dissident, to the extent possible a subversive, movement against the US government and social order; atrocity propaganda; sympathetic stories and reports of VC and NVN; continuous anti-Saigon government propaganda.

5. Within the US theater (as global) the longtime fellow-travelers, sympathizers and dupes of the Communists —including those who have remained covert—have automatically lined up in a de facto united front. Some of them are already finding their way to Hanoi, forming committees, etc., and establishing active contact with their similars in other countries—in many cases reviving old acquaintances from numerous Communist-controlled conferences sponsored by the World Peace Council and other international fronts. However, in the present situation the "antiwar movement"—assuming that the Vietnam conflict is to be protracted and expanded—extends potentially far beyond the circles with which the Communists and/or fellow travelers have in the past been able to establish active contact. If the conflict is long, protracted and frustrating, it is safe to predict that an antiwar movement formidable in size and intensity will develop from many sectors of the population: the youth (with the additional motivation of fear or hatred of the draft); the intellectuals; the clergy; the media; the left wings of the major parties; in due course, political figures either influenced by ideological considerations or feeling that antiwar is the wave of the electoral future.

"In the present situation the 'antiwar movement'—assuming that the Vietnam conflict is to be protracted and expanded—extends potentially far beyond the circles with which the Communists and/or fellow travelers have in the past been able to establish active contact. If the conflict is long, protracted and frustrating, it is safe to predict that an antiwar movement formidable in size and intensity will develop from many sectors of the population. . . . If the antiwar movement reached a sufficiently broad and developed level—as it would probably do if the conflict is sufficiently drawn out—this would mean that the Communists would be in a position of psycho-political leverage from which they could exercise a considerable degree of control over the US political process, at least with respect to Indochina."

6. This antiwar sentiment and the mass antiwar movement into which it has already begun to develop has historical, psychological and moral roots not overtly related to Communism or the Communists. The Communists and their allies, in the US and globally, will not exercise direct control over its development and all of its activities, though they will over some. But, objectively considered, the antiwar movement will constitute a receptor for the Communist psycho-political operations: it will be, in a general way, in resonance. This means that Hanoi, the Communist apparatus in the US, and global Communism will be able to use the antiwar movement as a transmitting mechanism through which their ideas, slogans and proposals of the moment can reach and influence the broad US public in a "denatured" form, stripped of the taint of a too obviously Communist or enemy (Hanoi) origin. If the antiwar movement reached a sufficiently broad and developed level—as it would probably do if the conflict is sufficiently drawn out—this would mean that the Communists would be in a position of psycho-political leverage from which they could exercise a considerable degree of control over the US political process, at least with respect to Indochina.

May 1954: CINCPAC Considers Nuclear Demonstration Drop Outside Haiphong

An early memorandum dated 26 May 1954 from Admiral Arthur W. Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, entitled "Studies with Respect to Possible US Action Regarding Indochina," had included the recommendation (3.a), "Employing atomic weapons, whenever advantageous. . . ." The text of the following cable from Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, then Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff—though carefully obscured in spite of its ultra-secret designation—indicates that the proposal to make one or another use of nuclear weapons remained alive within the military as well as at least one section of the intelligence communities.

12 Feb. 1965
FROM: CINCPAC
TO: JCS
SUBJ: LIGHTNING
A. YOUR 210114Z
B. CINCPAC 211002Z (GENSER)
C. OPPLAN 65-34K

REF A REQUESTED STATUS OF CINCPAC COMMENTS ON REF C. REF B FURNISHED COMMENTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF REF C WITH EXCEPTION OF ANNEX NOVEMBER AND CINCPAC'S OVERALL ESTIMATE OF FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT OF SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF REF C ON DRV. THIS MESSAGE COMPLETES CINCPAC'S VIEWS ON PROPOSED OPERATION.

CONCUR IN GENERAL APPROACH CONTAINED IN ANNEX NOVEMBER WITH EXCEPTION OF POSTDROP AIRBORNE MONITORING REQUIREMENTS. GIVEN PROBABLE PRESENCE OF GVN UNITS OPERATING IN GULF NORTH OF 17TH PARALLEL AT DROP TIME, AND HIGHLY VARIABLE UPPER ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS PRE-

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VAILING THIS TIME OF YEAR, BELIEVE AT LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL PLATFORMS REQUIRED. PLATFORMS SHOULD HAVE CAPABILITY OF INITIATING COMMUNICATIONS WITH GVN UNITS AFTER DROP TO ADVISE OF PREDICTED FALLOUT PATTERNS, IF ANY. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON TWO PROPOSED SITES FOR DEMONSTRATION DROP SKETCHY AT BEST. HOWEVER, BELIEVE ALTERNATIVE SITE A PREFERABLE. WHILE VISUAL IMPACT OF DROP WILL BE SINGLE MOST DRAMATIC DIMENSION, SITE A OFFERS PROBABLE SUBSTANTIAL AUDIO DIMENSION AS WELL, GIVEN REDUCED DISTANCE FROM HAIPHONG. TOTAL POPULATION AND CIVILIAN/MILITARY RATIOS AT BOTH SITES BELIEVED ROUGHLY EQUAL.

CINCPAC BELIEVES THAT REF C OFFERS SINGLE BEST POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO A FAVORABLE, DECISIVE AND SPEEDY END TO PRESENT CONFLICT. POLICY OF GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE HAS NOT YIELDED ANY DISCERNIBLE RESULTS TO DATE, NOR IS THERE GROUND FOR BELIEVING IT WILL DO SO IN FUTURE, SINCE EACH US STEP IN PROGRAM OF GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE CAN BE ANTICIPATED BY ENEMY, WHO CAN TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES IN ADVANCE TO MINIMIZE EFFECTS OF THESE STEPS. GRADUATED MILITARY PRESSURE SCENARIO GUARANTEES DRV ABILITY TO PREPARE ITSELF MILITARILY, ECONOMICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT STEP. BY ITS VERY NATURE, THIS POLICY GIVES THE ENEMY OUR WAR PLANS IN ADVANCE.

CINCPAC BELIEVES ENEMY STAYING POWER IN VN CONFLICT CONSISTENTLY UNDERESTIMATED. GIVEN POLITICAL DICTATORSHIP IN DRV, ENEMY STAYING POWER PROBABLY SUPERIOR TO US. A LONG DRAWN OUT CONFLICT WILL WORK TO ENEMY'S ADVANTAGE, NOT OURS, AND POLICY OF GRADUATED MILITARY RESPONSE PRACTICALLY GUARANTEES AN EXTENDED CONFLICT.

CINCPAC CONCURS THAT INCREASED RISK OF TENSIONS WITH CHICOMS AND USSR WILL RESULT FROM SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF DEMONSTRATION DROP. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS PRIMARY CRITERION FOR DETERMINING SCOPE AND NATURE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SE ASIA, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT WITHDRAWAL IS PREFERRED COURSE OF ACTION. I BELIEVE OUR CURRENT STRATEGIC POSTURE SUFFICIENT TO DETER ANY RASH ACT BY EITHER CHICOMS OR USSR, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY NOT BE CASE FIVE YEARS FROM NOW.

TOTAL IMPACT OF A SUCCESSFUL HIGH ALTITUDE DROP OFF HAIPHONG HARBOR ON DRV LEADERSHIP IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE DIRECTLY. HOWEVER, CINCPAC FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO VISUALIZE ANY OTHER COURSE OF ACTION FOR US IN PRESENT CONFLICT WHICH WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO (A) BRING DRV TO CONFERENCE TABLE, (B) ENABLE US TO SETTLE CONFLICT ON FAVORABLE TERMS FOR OURSELVES AND GVN, AND (C) SAVE LIVES OF AMERICAN FIGHTING MEN.

Summer 1966: Joint Chiefs Assess the Feasibility and Productivity of 'Passive' and 'Active' Blockades of Cambodia and North Vietnam

In the summer of 1966, apparently in response to a request by the Secretary of Defense or Assistant Secretary McNaughton, the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyzed the requirements of a "full-blown" blockade of North Vietnam and Cambodia. Up to this point, only a blockade of the South Vietnamese coastline had been attempted, under the fairly successful Market Time program, and a blacklist of merchant ships which traded with North Vietnam had been established in order to reduce the availability of transport to the North Vietnamese.

The Joint Chiefs have reviewed the force requirements, possible command structures, and probable impact and effectiveness of alternative DRV blockade options. We find that, to be effective, any blockade will have to include the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville and any other potential deep- or medium-draft Cambodian offloading points. The following discussion is predicated on the assumption that Cambodia will be included in any blockade effort. We further assume that it will be desirable to retain the option in blockade of permitting certain selected ships to pass through (for example, those carrying foodstuffs for domestic NVN consumption). We wish to make clear that while we believe a full-blown blockade to be a *necessary* condition if DRV support of forces in SVN is to be terminated, a blockade, by itself, will not be *sufficient* to do the job alone.

Two basic options, or some combination, are open to blockade planners:

1. *Passive blockade.* A passive blockade would be confined to measures which avoid any face-to-face US/DRV or US/Communist bloc confrontation on the high seas or in DRV territorial waters. Measures to be taken in such a blockade would include (but not be limited to) aerial, surface and subsurface mining of all DRV and Cambodian ports and approaches thereto, placement of obstacles such as sunken concrete-laden barges and LSTs in harbors and approaches, utilizing SVN naval forces to intercept, board and inspect any ships which request permission to pass through blockade (or attempt to run it), and a greatly expanded U.S. intelligence effort to detect potential blockade runners and discriminate between ships carrying permissible (if any) cargos from those carrying contraband.

"No blockade will be 100% effective in denying outside material support to enemy forces in SVN. . . . Road transport of material from China through DRV to SVN can probably be reduced to 50 tons a month, considering expected losses in transit. Given minimal Soviet and Chicom sustained airlift capability, air leakage should be inconsequential."

2. *Active blockade.* An active blockade would involve the overt participation of US naval and air forces in the interception, boarding, inspection and engagement (if necessary) of any ships which attempted to run the blockade. An active blockade would include most of the elements of the passive blockade option as well.

Leakages. No blockade will be 100% effective in denying outside material

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support to enemy forces in SVN. Leakages can be expected consisting of material produced in DRV and shipped overland to SVN as well as supplies which enter into DRV overland from Chinese border. However, sustained and concentrated aerial bombardment of Lao Kay and Lang Son rail links to China can reduce rail leakage to minimal amounts. Road transport of material from China through DRV to SVN can probably be reduced to 50 tons a month, considering expected losses in transit. Given minimal Soviet and Chicom sustained airlift capability, air leakage should be inconsequential.

Force requirements

1. *Passive blockade.* Considerable reinforcement of mine warfare forces in WESTPAC would be required: a) a minimum of two additional MSF divisions; b) additional surveillance capability; c) one squadron of P3-As or two squadrons of S2s, with land-based support requirements; d) augmentation of intelligence assets, including one additional AFTR and two airborne ELINT platforms. One on-station and one reserve SS would be of considerable value. MSFs will need surface combatant support when carrying out operations in hostile environment. At least one DD division will be necessary for this mission. Further material and logistic support will need to be furnished to SVN navy units engaged in intercept and inspection duties.

2. *Active Blockade.* In addition to assets needed to support passive blockade, two additional divisions of DDs and two divisions of PTFs would be required. Air cover of US intercept and inspection operations can probably be tasked to Yankee Team carrier.

Command Structure

Experience gained in Market Time operations suggests the need for a single over-all authority to exercise command and control of any full-blown blockade effort. Given the potential sensitive political problems arising in the carrying out of any blockade, and the need for immediate, high-level response to developing situations, it is suggested that the command and control element in charge of blockade operations be directly subordinate to CINCPAC.

Potential Problems

In addition to the international political problems discussed elsewhere in this memorandum, certain operational problems arising out of any blockade can be foreseen. These include: detonation of mines by ships carrying permissible cargo, with resulting international complication. . . . As we have discovered from Market Time ops, Hainan Island will play a crucial role in any attempts to evade a blockade. Accordingly, any blockade line and intelligence collection program will have to be designed to insure maximum detection of transshipments from Hainan. . . . Coastal traffic between China and NVN will probably be best countered via a passive barrier in the Mon Cay vicinity on the NVN/Chicom border. Active operations in this area will be difficult to carry out and subject to substantial risk of active interference from NVN or Chicom naval forces.

Probable impact of and international repercussions from full-blown blockade operation lie outside scope of request.

June 1963: A Prominent American Academician Analyzes US Cultural Impatience with Protracted and Treacherous War

Summary of draft memorandum "Protracted Conflict and American Historical and Societal Character," from the Committee of Historians and Cultural Anthropologists, prepared by Professor Daniel Boorstin of the Dept. of History, University of Chicago, to President John F. Kennedy, June 30, 1963.

In accordance with your request of May 30, 1963 the full Committee met June 7-12 in Chicago to review the problem of protracted conflict in the context of American historical experience and from the perspective of current societal values. These conferences and a review of relevant data issued in the following tentative conclusions.

1. In the abstract, a prolonged conflict in Vietnam, characterized, when necessary, by increasing pressure upon the enemy applied in minimal increments, would appear both rational and prudent. It would appear to avoid the extremes of both defeat and large-scale, possibly nuclear, warfare.

2. However, serious objections to such a course exist on the grounds of the American historical experience as that has shaped the habits and expectations of Americans at the present time. Some of the basic points are:

a) American society is achievement-oriented. The American expects his efforts to issue in definite, even measurable results. When his efforts fail to produce such results he becomes embittered and, often, irrational. (See Appendix A: Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Cultural Goals and Institutional Norms"; also, Merton and Rossi, "Reference Group Theory and Social Mobility.") It should be pointed out that the expectation of definite and/or measurable results does not exist in societies where a different conditioning has prevailed. In such non-achievement oriented societies, the individual is often content to go from day to day for long periods of time sustained by other kinds of values built into the culture.

"American society is achievement-oriented. The American expects his efforts to issue in definite, even measurable results. When his efforts fail to produce such results he becomes embittered and, often, irrational."

b) American society is "progressive" in the sense that effort is expected to produce not only tangible results but a general improvement in the over-all state of affairs. When such improvement is not forthcoming, dysfunctioning, both individual and systemic, is likely to result. (See Appendix B: John A. Clausen, "The Sociology of Mental Illness"; Albert K. Cohen, "The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior.")

c) American society is individualistic and contractual in significant respects. This means that the individual is less content to subordinate his own satisfactions for the good of the larger social

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entity than he is in other societies, and this reluctance increases exponentially in the absence of the rewards noted in a and b. (See Appendix C: William J. Goode, "The Sociology of the Family"; Georg Simmel, "Conflict and the Structure of the Group.") The failure of the group to produce such expected rewards characteristically results in rebellious behavior directed at the group, as well as the "de-legitimizing" of said group.

d) The factor of time pervades American socio-cultural value systems to an unprecedented degree. (See Appendix D: H. Werner, et al., "Rhythmic Activity and the Perception of Time"; J. A. Dyal and T. A. Holland, "Discrimination Reaction Time as a Joint Function of Manifest Anxiety and Intelligence"; and H. C. J. Duijker and N. H. Frijda, "National Character and National Stereotypes.") In all areas of his daily life, Professor Mead noted, the American is conditioned to an environment of speed, to a high degree of automaticity and to efficiency in a wide variety of social and economic relations. This produces "impatience" when time expectations are not satisfied. (See Appendix E: P. E. Meehl, "Schizotaxia, Schizotypy and Schizophrenia.") Professor Cottrell observed the relationship between time in American life generally and time as a factor in mass American entertainment, as in professional football, hockey, boxing, etc., where the clock is a key element in the total experience. Professor Cottrell pointed out that American sport, relative to sports in other socio-cultural contexts, makes little provision for "stalemate"; and further, that the mass American sporting heroes are the "knock-out" puncher, the "home run" hitter, and the professional quarterback who "throws the long bomb." He persuaded the other conferees that these were important clues to American cultural-emotional patterns.

e) In contrast to other cultures, Americans exhibit a very high boredom coefficient. This is related to the time factor discussed above. Several conferees felt that a "protracted conflict" would, among other effects, produce widespread boredom, apathy etc. Professor McLuhan made the point that television, even the televised news, is from one perspective *entertainment*. No audience, he said, would tolerate the same show night after night indefinitely.

f) American society is increasingly technological. The American lives in an environment where technological power is characteristically brought to bear to achieve specific results in a short period of time. This conditions his expectations generally. It is worth noting that the young—i.e., those who would bear most of the burden of the war—are precisely the segment of the population *most* conditioned by the post-World War II environment of technological efficiency.

3. The wars fought by the United States since the industrial revolution have been relatively short (contrast the Thirty Years War, the Hundred Years War, the extended conflict between England and France between 1688 and 1815, the Peloponnesian War and many other earlier conflicts, not to mention the most pertinent of all, the war that has been waged by Vietnamese against each other, the Japanese, the French and the Americans for the last half-century). The American wars have been characterized by the concentrated application of power and the sudden "breakthrough." The American military services are a reflection of the larger American society and its ethos, and nothing in the historical experience of either would seem to make it easily adaptable to protracted conflict. (See Appendix F: R. A. Katzell, "Contrasting Systems of Work Organization"; Robert M. Gagne, "Military Training and Principles of Learning"; also Milton Jensen, "Adjustive and Non-Adjustive Reaction to Basic Training in the Air Force.")

4. The "Report of the Subcommittee on Southeast Asia" emphasized the contrast between the American and Vietnamese socio-cultural context, viz. whereas the prevailing value structure in America is *negative* as regards protracted conflict, the prevailing value structure in Southeast Asia is *positive*. In the case of each factor, a) through f), the Vietnamese is better adapted to this kind of warfare than the American.

5. *Conclusion:* It was the conclusion of the Committee that on these and other grounds specified at length in the Report that from a social-anthropological-historical perspective the waging of a protracted conflict in Vietnam is contra-indicated.

February 1965: Notes by Secretary of State on Conference Resulting in Decision not To Ask for Declaration of War

Handwritten note by Secretary of State summarizing the results of a high-level departmental meeting at which the advisability of seeking a declaration of war had been discussed, dated Feb. 10, 1965.

The following reasons pro and con were adduced during the meeting:

a) Decl. of war against NLF (The National Liberation Front created by Hanoi as the ostensibly South Vietnamese framework for the North Vietnamese effort) is out of question; it would elevate that entity to the dignity of a state and would preclude any ultimate political success of our action.

b) Decl. of war on North Vietnam unadvisable because of the mixture of Southern subversive and Northern military and paramilitary operations; also because of consistent denial of Hanoi that its troops are operating in the South.

c) Precedent of Korea as an undeclared war.

d) For a short term effort, Tonkin Res. is sufficient, decl. of war would become desirable only if war were to last for years. In view of sharp actions proposed by Joint Chiefs, including active blockade, cutting Ho Chi Minh Trail, and exerting diplomatic and economic pressures on SU, one must anticipate rapid attrition of aggressive potential of DRV by late 1966, and conclusion of overt military operations. After that only mopping up operations.

e) Commitment of US troops by Pres. without declaration has ample precedents (over 100 times?).

f) Decl. conjures up prospect of use of atomic weapons which we do not want even to suggest.

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ROADWORK

The Great Airbag Hassle

ROBERT S. STROTHER

To demonstrate a new motorcar safety device, a test vehicle was driven into a barrier at the General Motors proving-ground in Michigan one day last spring at precisely thirty miles an hour. Whereupon, the following events occurred almost instantaneously:

A sensing instrument on the front of the car identified the shock as of emergency dimensions. It flashed an electric signal to a steel bottle containing air under 3,500 pounds pressure. The signal broke a tempered glass diaphragm. There was a shotgun-like explosion. The compressed air shot into an airbag stored under the instrument panel. The airbag ballooned out, filling the space between the front seat and the windshield.

That entire sequence required one-sixtieth of a second. By the time the initial impact had hurled the robot "passenger" forward in his seat a split second later, the airbag was in place. The dummy's head rammed into the airbag instead of the windshield, with no harm done.

Guests at the demonstration hailed the "passive resistance" device as a remarkable technical achievement. Even more remarkable, however, was a government edict concerning it. Nobody knew how well it would work in traffic, how much it would cost, or how it could be produced, installed and kept in service. Nevertheless, in September of 1970, the government ordered that every new car made or sold in the United States after August 15, 1973, have the airbag or an equivalent device in the front passenger compartment. One year later, the Federal Highway Safety Bureau ordained, back seat passengers must be similarly protected. The FHSB is an off-shoot of the Department of Transportation, and its word is law.

The federal directive was issued to the auto manufacturers, who must make extensive changes in car design before the costly air cushion device can be installed. The car buyer, who will be forced to pay for it whether he wants it or not, was not consulted.

General Motors believes the airbag can become "the best 'passenger restraint system' possible in the current state of the art." The corporation protests, however, that it cannot meet the mid-1973 deadline, remarking tartly that "It is beyond the scope of their authority to issue a standard based on the hope or speculation that the industry can figure out some way to meet it by the effective date."

Dealers' groups are worried. While they are happy to sell accessories, they predict a hot reaction from people forced to buy the airbag device. "How would you like to pay $200 or $300 to have a shotgun fired in your ear and a rubber raft dumped in your lap if you happen to bump into a tree?" one of them told a reporter.

Henry Ford II, whose company like the others is working to meet a deadline they all consider impossible, denounces the airbag as "a lot of baloney." "They are damned expensive and they may not work," he told a year-end news conference in Detroit.

Some critics of the compulsory airbag concept point out that efforts to develop the device were begun only when it was discovered that 70 per cent of all motorists decline to hook up their safety belts. If a majority of motorists do not want to protect themselves in that way, why should the government compel all new-car buyers to invest in costly equipment which might—or might not—protect them in spite of themselves?

Auto industry executives largely ignore philosophical objections to government dictation in order to concentrate on the bristling array of practical air cushion problems. With them the question of reliability overshadows all the others. Obviously if the sensing device mistakes a minor nudge on the highway for a crash and the air-bladder erupts into the driver's face, he is in grim trouble.

"We are working for a reliability of .9999, or only one failure in 10,000," says David D. Campbell, engineer in charge of the project at GM. "That is greater reliability than was required of components in the Apollo that took the three astronauts to the moon and back. . . . It is a formidable assignment."

Lee A. Iacocca, new President of Ford, agrees with that understatement. "We are having a lot of trouble with the sensing devices," he said. "We want to put airbags on two hundred to four hundred of our company fleet cars on a voluntary basis, but we aren't getting many volunteers."

Motorists can understand why that is. If you bring up the subject of new car troubles with the first five men you meet at the bowling alley, eight will tell you stories of cars delivered with the offset Pittsmans hooked into the bilge pump sump capstan, or some such thing. Therefore, they ask, what new race of keen, hawk-eyed assembly-line workers is going to install the air cushions? And wouldn't it be just your luck that when the airbag for your car came down the line the chief inspector had just knocked off for a smoke?

Even assuming that the .9999 reliability actually is achieved, there would still be hundreds of "non-crash inadvertent inflations" every year.

As the demonstration showed, "deployment" is a dramatic affair. Industry executives are understandably worried about the hazards of air cushion inflation. For instance, will it deafen people in the car? Here is Mr. Campbell:

"A front seat air cushion installation with an inflated volume of from ten to twelve cubic feet typically reaches an impulse sound level of 168 decibels," he explains.

How loud is that? Well, one of his colleagues admitted to the same audience, "it does resemble a shotgun being fired."

Tests run by the Navy and by FHSB indicate that a 168-decibel blast will not cause permanent loss of hearing in a healthy passenger who happens to be looking straight ahead. If his ear is aimed at the sound source, he could lose an eardrum. It seems safe to predict that the blast could scare the average motorist out of a year's growth and cause him—and especially her—to ram into the nearest utility pole. Far from adopting a "better deaf than dead" at-

(Continues on page 825)

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BOOKS

Men without God

The Gods of Atheism
By Vincent P. Miceli S.J.
Arlington, 490 pp., $12.50

WILL HERBERG

Men, sinful men, "fallen" men—that is, all men in history—have always been in revolt against God, because (and this is the essential mark of their sinfulness, their "fallenness") they have always exhibited a virtually unconquerable reluctance to acknowledge their own creatureliness and an equally unconquerable urge to organize life and reality around themselves as center, individually or collectively. But this revolt has taken many forms and a variety of expressions. In his delusions of self-sufficiency, man has tended to make his vitality, his reason, his cultural creativity, even his religion, into a vehicle of his frantic straining for absolute autonomy against God; and, almost always, he has implemented this urge toward self-absolutization by projecting some part or aspect of his humanness as the ultimate reality to be exalted and adored. Man's vitality becomes The Life-Force, his truth becomes The Truth, and so on.

In thus proceeding, man, in recent times usually collective man, betrays, at one and the same time, his metaphysical need—without some absolute, he cannot live or think—and his inner drive to self-exaltation. He is always manufacturing his own idols to suit his intellectual, spiritual and cultural predilections. This is the perennial condition of man, not merely today or yesterday, but through the succession of ages that marks his career in history.

Until recently, this inner resistance to the claims of theocentricity, found in all men as the mark of their original sin, was, in good conscience, generally masked by a pervasive conventional religiosity, as is still the case in a country like the United States. But, in the Western world, generally beginning with the late Renaissance, increasing numbers of the intellectual class have been found willing, nay, eager, to throw off the religious mask and defiantly repudiate the God of their tradition. These men are atheists in the explicit sense of the term, and, with them, the problem of atheism first emerged on any scale.

Father Vincent P. Miceli devotes this large, well-researched and well-argued volume to this problem. He has organized his material and his thinking very well. The analytical table of contents indicates this. After a rather brief general introduction, he proceeds to *Part I. Gods as Adventures of the Mind*, in which he discusses, with real understanding, such men as Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Marx and Comte. The next segment of five chapters—*Part II. Gods as Passions of the Heart*—is devoted to Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Here the treatment is not as adequate as in the first part, but Father Miceli does make it clear that, by including Bonhoeffer in this list, he is not suggesting that Bonhoeffer was an atheist of any kind or anything other than a devoted Christian theologian. What he is saying is that certain elements in Bonhoeffer's teaching, torn out of context, distorted and misunderstood, have been made the point of departure of a certain type of contemporary atheism.



He also tries to do justice to the uncertain, equivocal atheism of a Camus or a Merleau-Ponty, but, in the case of the former, I do not think at all adequately: he does not seem to appreciate the profound religio-theological significance of Camus' trilogy (*L'Etranger*, *La Peste* and *La Chute*) or the poignancy of the agonizing question in *La Peste*: "Can one be a saint without believing in God? That is the question, the important question." One might also quarrel with the easy way in which Father Miceli places Heidegger, despite his own protestations, among the atheists.

TROUBLE EMERGES in the third and fourth parts—*Part III. Gods as Myths of the Modern Mentality* (Bultmann, Tillich, Bishop Robinson and Harvey Cox); *Part IV. Gods as Victims of Man* (Vahanian, Altizer, Hamilton, Van Buren). The collections are so heterogeneous, the classifications so tenuous, that, however valuable Father Miceli's comments may be, the questions that arise in the mind of the informed reader, the objections that assail him, prove overwhelming.

What disturbs me most, however, in these latter two parts is the utter lack of discrimination that the author exhibits in piling up his cases. With the same seriousness that he presents the systems and criticisms of the really significant thinkers he discusses from Feuerbach to Tillich, he asks us to take the shallow muddleheadedness of Bishop Robinson, the lightweight irrelevancies

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RANDOM NOTES

■ JUST OUT: *This Great Game* is the splashiest baseball book yet, with 76 pages of full color plus 150 black-and-white photos (Prentice-Hall, $14.95). . . . *Zhukov* is a sympathetic biography by Otto P. Chaney Jr. (Oklahoma, $9.95). . . . B. H. Haggin's *The New Listener's Companion and Record Guide* is newly revised (Horizon, $7.50; paper, $3.95). . . . Max Gallo's *Robespierre the Incorruptible* is billed as a "psychobiography" (Herder & Herder, $8.50).

■ AUGUST TITLES. *Second in Command: The Uncensored Account of the Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo,* by executive officer Edward R. Murphy and Curt Gentry, gives Commander Bucher a going-over (Holt, $8.95). . . . *Down the Line* is the autobiography of Bayard Rustin (Quadrangle, $10). . . . J. L. Talmon offers three longish essays in *Israel Among the Nations* (Macmillan, $5.95). . . . *The Grand Churchill* is a collection of portraits of Randolph by a mixed bag including Arthur Krock, Jacqueline Onassis, Malcolm Muggeridge and Oscar Levant. Edited by Kay Halle (Houghton, $7.95). . . . *In the Twenties: The Diaries of Harry Kessler* is the chronicle of Weimar's ambassador to Warsaw (Holt, $10). . . . *"Do You Sincerely Want to be Rich?"* records the rise and fall of Bernie Cornfeld. By Godfrey Hodgson, Bruce Page, Charles Raw (Viking, $8.95). . . . Robert Browning's *Justinian and Theodora* is scholarly and lavishly illustrated (Praeger, $15).

■ COMING IN SEPTEMBER: *NR* contributor Gordon Tullock proposes radical changes in our legal system that may displease—*NR* readers. His controversial new book is *The Logic of the Law* (Basic, $7.95). . . . Peregrine Worsthorne's *The Socialist Myth* comes down hard on the Labor Party (Weybright & Talley, $6.95). . . . Howard Mumford Jones out with another tome, *The Age of Energy: Varieties of American Experience, 1865-1915* (Viking, $12.50). . . . Car buffs beware: *Edsel* is not for you. It's Karl Shapiro's first novel (Geis, $6.95).

The Poems of Dylan Thomas is the most complete collection yet, includes many never published before (New Directions, $6). . . . *The Sexual Emancipation of a Communist Woman* is the autobiography of Alexandra Kollantai, a member of Lenin's first revolutionary council (Herder & Herder, $5.95). . . . In case 365 days a year won't do you, Ruth Adler takes you on *A Day in the Life of the New York Times* (Lippincott, $5.95). . . . Edward Crankshaw's *The Habsburgs: Portrait of a Dynasty* is big and heavily illustrated (Viking, $16.50). . . . Warren Moscow's biography of Carmine De Sapio is called—optimistically? pessimistically?—*The Last of the Big-Time Bosses* (Stein & Day, $7.95).

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of Harvey Cox, the obscure grotesqueries of Thomas Altizer, the contentless pietism of William Hamilton and Paul Van Buren's confusion of linguistic (conceptual) analysis with logical positivism and its crude Verification Principle. Characteristically, Father Miceli shows himself much too generous in including on the same level, or almost the same level, thinkers of altogether different weight and significance.

THIS BRINGS ME to the most serious defect of this admirable work: Father Miceli seems to be of the opinion—at least, so he writes—that explicit atheism is ravaging the Western world today. But this is an error, an error that Father Miceli shares with a number of other well-meaning, well-informed commentators. Aside from the fact that *explicit* atheism never affected more than a relatively small segment of the intellectual and cultural elite in the Western world, even this atheism has been on the decline for a generation.

John Lukacs is quite right, in his recent work (*The Passing of the Modern Age*), in noting that, by the second half of this century, "atheism was becoming disreputable even among the intelligentsia, . . . the Age of Reason seemed little more than a past chimera." A critique of explicit atheism is always in place, and Father Miceli does good service here; but such a critique should be placed in the context of a realistic understanding of the changing cultural situation. It is not explicit atheism that afflicts Western culture today, but a weird complex of superstitions and idolatries, which still demand proper analysis and religio-cultural evaluation.

Associated with this misconception is another. Father Miceli conveys the impression that Christianity, the Church, finds itself in a deep crisis in this "Age of Atheism," in sharp contrast to the benevolent security of the Ages of Faith. But this is an illusion. Christianity, the Church, has *always* been in crisis, although the crisis has taken various forms. In 1263, at the height of the Ages of Faith, during the lifetime of Saint Thomas Aquinas, in the reign of Louis IX (St. Louis!), Bishop Guy of Auxerre, speaking for the assembled hierarchy, thus addressed the king: "Sire, these archbishops and bishops here assembled have instructed me to tell you that Christianity is decaying and disappearing in your realm, and that it will decay still more if you do not take heed. Nowadays, nobody is afraid of being excommunicated" (in Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, ed. N. de Wailly, 1874, pp. 368-370). Crisis enough, it would seem. Nothing is gained by glamorizing the past; much is lost, the profound sense of man's perennial sinfulness, exhibited in "fallen" man's alienation from God and the Word of God throughout history.

THESE CRITICISMS ARE not trivial, but, in the totality of Father Miceli's work, they are definitely secondary. Father Miceli concludes with three important theses, which I can do no better than summarize:

1. Despite its intellectual pretensions, explicit atheism is primarily, or even importantly, a matter not of the intellect, but of the will. "They do not believe," Sören Kierkegaard repeats, "they do not believe because they will not obey." And Joseph de Maistre had already noted: "Atheism does not reside, or start, in the intelligence. No one has ceased to believe in God before having decided that he *should* not exist; no book would produce atheism, and no book can restore faith."

2. Atheism brings with it a shattering crisis of the intellect. The best of the nineteenth-century "free-thinkers" and devotees of Science understood this very well. Ernest Renan reflected: "The religious man perhaps lives for a shadow; but we [who trust in science] live for the shadow of a shadow: what will those who come after us live by?"

3. Atheism, "atheist humanism [is] a cancer in community life" (Miceli, p. 463). This has been so amply demonstrated by experience and history, and by the writings of recent thinkers, that it scarcely needs elaboration. "When man ceases to worship God, he comes to worship himself; he takes it upon himself [collectively] to swallow up and destroy his fellows" (Sören Kierkegaard). "But can man live [in society] without transcendence, . . . after the transcendence of God has been eliminated? How?" (Raymond Aron). Here speaks the wisdom of the ages. □

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The Prisoner of Sex
By Norman Mailer
Little, Brown, 240 pp., $5.95

NORMAN MAILER MEETS THE BUTCH BRIGADE

JOHN GREENWAY

Of all the unkind cuts Ernest Hemingway suffered in his life the one that most touched him to the quick was an offhand remark that he had false hair on his chest. When truth for him finally broke through the defenses of his virility—bullfighting, boxing, boozing, hunting and whoring—when he agreed at last that he, like everything else, was *nada*, he blew his brains out. I should not want Mr. Mailer to do himself any similar mischief, but since in his more abnegative moments he imagines himself the Hemingway of the Chicken Generation, the truth must be spoken: Norman Mailer has false hair on his pubes.

I have no apprehension whatever that Mailer will ever reach for the immolating shotgun, for he has always expected more of himself than his talent or will could possibly supply. Hemingway long intended to commit suicide; Mailer is determined to die of cancer. Though he has erected much the same barricades against the imputation of impotence, there are enough differences between the two men to assure the bifurcation of their terminal paths. Our Hemingway saw masculinity residing in his biceps and barrel chest; Mailer goes for the groin. Ernest was a heavyweight, the Dominant Male in any group he entered; Norman is the little twit on the edge of the street gang, plucking the sleeves of the big studs so they will look at his latest dirty pictures, growing his hair into a Long Branch Afro to better look like a ghetto junkie, and being tolerated by nearly everybody for his mouth, like Spit among the Dead End Kids. After all, when he can call Cassius Clay—beg pardon, Abdullah Bulbul Amir—"the swiftest embodiment of human intelligence we have met yet" and get the estimation printed by the tens of thousands, think what he might do for the least of us!

But could anyone imagine Papa Hemingway crashing a meeting of Women's Lip as its "major ideological opposition" and being thrown out on his ear, as Mailer did a few weeks ago? Or writing a book like *The Prisoner of Sex*, a wrist-slapping spat with Kate Millett over whether the male is a walking abortion, an incomplete female, and losing the argument?

The book is not entirely a hair-pulling match with the Butch Brigade. That would be too coherent for a Mailer dissertation. It is also an appreciation of that old pornographer Henry Miller, whom Kate also rubbishes. Mailer upon Millett upon Miller—there's troilism for you, a literary perversion in which not even Justice Douglas could find redeeming social value. And of course Mailer must use part of his book to indecently caress his ego; the first chapter is a fantasy about his winning the Nobel Prize. But what the hell. If the Orange Juice Freak can win two of them, why shouldn't Norman Mailer get one?

In itself *The Prisoner of Sex* is not worth much attention. Its subject, Women's Lip, is worth none. But almost a quarter of a century has passed since *The Naked and the Dead* announced the rise of a brilliant young writer; it is time to ask where exactly he is now and where he is likely to go.

His road has been precipitately downhill. He hit the floor with *King of the Hill* earlier this year. The cliché says he can only go up from the bottom, but with *The Prisoner of Sex* he is just crawling around on the canvas as the count nears ten. What has he accomplished in 23 years?

Stylistically he is in the great literary tradition of the late Judge Michael A. Musmanno, though in each succeeding book he writes like the last man he reads, as Hubert Humphrey talks like the last man he hears. *The Prisoner of Sex* is Miller upon Musmanno. As a rhetorician Mailer perfects in this work his single syntactic invention, the use of "yes" as a conjunction, using it here to construct sentences hundreds of words long, dragging themselves around like wounded snakes. He said once his ambition was "to become consecutively more disruptive, more dangerous and more powerful."

Failing to do that with his writing, he ran for mayor of New York, making himself a classic example of Eric Hoffer's Creative Poor—abortive artists who, unable to change themselves, set about to change the world. He assaulted the barrier against the fundamental four-letter word in *The Naked and the Dead* with his three-letter "fug," but now that he can—and does—write any filthiness he can think of, wallowing at last in the ordure he once was allowed only to stir with a stick, he makes us wonder whether censorship protected rather than hindered him, making us suppose there was more in his writing than he was permitted to say. Permissiveness stripped him naked and left him moribund if not quite dead.

So what is his function, now that so much evidence is in? Bill Buckley called him "an utter and hopeless mess." That is a supportable view, but I take a more religious position. I think him to be a cosmodemonic joke whose destiny was predetermined in the evening of Creation's sixth day, when all serious work was done. The omniscient eye of Providence must have seen his use as a bit of fun for these sad, latter days—to appear on the Merv Griffin Show talking about serious things with Mickey Rooney defensibly drunk or Margaret Mead indefensibly sober. That is his manifest destiny and he should thank God for it. It is not given to many men to know so clearly why they have been put on earth. Let him accept it and stop trying to push himself beyond his capacities by trying to be a boxer, writer, or mayor. □

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Communist China 1949-1969: A Twenty-Year Appraisal
Edited by Frank N. Trager and William Henderson
New York University Press, 356 pp., $9.50

THE REAL RED CHINA

DAVID BRUDNOY

They didn't assign books like this when I was in East Asian Studies at Yale and Harvard. They didn't then, they don't now, and they won't tomorrow. A book like this confounds the Ivy League intelligentsia's accepted wisdom about Mao's China that, oh well, it's not the best of all possible worlds, but it's ever so much nicer than Chiang Kai-shek's China, and things really are getting better, and after all, we simply *must* get on with the business of building bridges. And so on. They don't assign books like this in schools like that because the essays are scholarly, well argued, manifestly unenthusiastic about China today, and Edgar Snow wouldn't like them one little bit.

Messrs. Trager and Henderson have compiled a book that can't be ignored, but is—have you read a review of it anywhere else?—and which should be assigned reading for all students of China, the better to counter the euphoria of sinophiliacs like Hans Konigsberger (*Love and Hate in China*), Mr. Snow (*Red China Today*) and the whole dreary Table Tennis-Ash Can School of Sinology (Let a Hundred Ping-Pong Tournies Commence, and Dump Chiang's Taiwan in the Rubbish Heap).

THE fourteen essays cover a wide range of facets of Red China—ideology, administration and control, party politics, cultural revolution, military, economy, agrarian problems, education, literature and art, intellectuals, national minorities, relations with other Red nations and the future of American-Chinese contacts. The contributors, all distinguished, respected specialists, are not the sort who pop up on the late-night shows to reveal the truth to the gullible. In violation of a good rule of interesting book reviewing, I'll take the time to name them all: Theodore Hsi-en Chen, Jürgen Domes, C. T. Hsia, Frank A. Kierman Jr., E. Stuart Kirby, Father L. LaDany, Franz Michael, Robert A. Rupen, Vincent Y. C. Shih, Richard C. Thornton, Richard L. Walker, Col. William W. Whitson, Yuan-li Wu and the editors. QED. Together, their essays manage to cast a pall over the bright, sunny *China's Coming 'Round!* glee that appears to have taken hold even of people in Washington who should know better.

CHINA IS *not* coming around. Granted, her leaders have stopped murdering millions of "bourgeois reactionaries" as as they did in the early Fifties—there aren't many left—but her foreign adventurism, domestic repressiveness and cultural stagnation attest to the view that things are very glum indeed. Dr. Shih's incisive essay on "The State of the Intellectuals," to pick one of the book's finest, proves that the Red Chinese attitude of 1939 is orthodox practice even today. They then wrote: "Intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who are useful in various degrees and who are basically loyal should be given appropriate work, trained adequately and led gradually to correct their weaknesses in the course of our sustained struggle, in order to enable them to remould themselves to adopt truly the point of view of the people and to get along with the veteran party members and other members of worker and peasant stock." Read that again. This is still



what passes for intellectual freedom in the land so adored by that crowd in America always braying for "regularizing" relations with China.

Shih's piece shows how Chinese intellectuals, in case after case, have been squeezed into line or else driven to silence, and some to prison or death. A representative example is the brilliant Ting Ling, a Stalin Prize winner in 1948, who followed her beliefs in individualism to their logical conclusion, for which she was rewarded with deprivation of her rights as a writer and citizen and sentenced to two years of "labor reform" in northern China. And Ting Ling's case is far from the most egregious. There is still no place for the intellectuals in China today, Dr. Shih concludes. So, too, for anyone who diverges from the current In line, whatever his station, notwithstanding his accomplishments.

THE AUTHORS do not rant or fulminate or sputter. They simply show, with statistics where available, with representative instances where that is all that can be used, what the paradise of blue ants is like after twenty years. The concluding essay, by the editors, ranks with Dr. Shih's among the most intriguing. Even were one to say that internal conditions in China are not properly our concern—and many who are morally repelled by what Mao's China represents would say that consistency and national self-interest require that the United States not determine her relations with China on the basis of Americans' feelings about China's hideousness to her own people—we should realize, as Professors Trager and Henderson so clearly, calmly, convincingly lead us to realize, that "the foreign policy of Communist China poses an unlimited threat to American interests in Asia [which are] to prevent the organization of East Asia under the leadership of a power, or concert of powers, hostile to the United States."

We must not gloss over the fact that Mao has publicly stated his indifference to the appalling human price that would be exacted by a thermonuclear holocaust, a holocaust which China's growing capacity to launch a thermonuclear strike makes ever more possible. The editors of *Communist China* do not explicitly conclude, but this reviewer does, that *any* softening of our hard line toward Red China will benefit her economy, which will enhance her ability to produce the devices necessary to wage just such a war, and hence will most definitely not be in America's self-interest, which means, in the interests of the relatively free remainder of the world not yet under Communist domination. Perhaps someone in the White House might be prevailed upon to plop this book down on Mr. Nixon's desk—after quietly dropping the ping-pong balls into the circular file, of course. □

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The Dark Night of Resistance
By Daniel Berrigan
Doubleday, 181 pp., $5.95

INVERSION OF TRADITION

SHELDON M. SMITH

In the fourth century, in North Africa, there existed a strange sect called the Circumcellions, who believed that salvation came primarily by martyrdom. Roaming the woods and highways, they would stop travelers and invite them to beat their brains in. If the accosted ones refused, the Circumcellions would beat *their* brains in, salvation being a good thing. The spirit of the Circumcellions has not died: witness Father Daniel Berrigan's latest.

It was written, so the publisher tells us, between the time that Father Dan was released on bail following the Catonsville trial, and the time when the Feds caught up with him. One does not expect too coherent a structure from someone who is "resisting arrest," but even with that allowance one can only ask: How did a professed disciple of Ignatius Loyola get this way?

Dark Night is a potpourri of short pieces, definitions, blank verse, that does not easily lend itself to review. But then, this is a book that does not pretend to continuity. It is designed to evoke moods, to produce passions, to stir glowing coals. It may do so among those who are susceptible to a mélange of Christian mysticism, Zen, pacifism, violence and large hunks of self-pity. ("Have you ever attended one of our political trials, seen us dragged off, read the cheap price put on our lives by the frosty eye of power?")

THE BOOK starts off with the invocation of St. John of the Cross, the sixteenth-century mystic of the "way of negation." John, in his own day, was persecuted by his ecclesiastical superiors, in alliance with the state, and so far so good. But then comes the first mind-bender: John is invoked not only as "*Doctor de la Nada*," but as "guru of the absurd." And that is the first inkling of what lies ahead. What lies ahead is a kind of theological Luddism ("Almost no son today can see his father against a landscape of human usefulness, celebration, simplicity. Whose father offers anything primitive,

The intentions were good. The results were an orgy of waste and destruction.

This objective, immensely readable book tells what happened when young gang leaders were given large sums of money to combat crime and poverty . . . and shows how good intentions could have produced good results.



In the belief that positive change within the ghetto must be self-activated and internally directed, both federal and private grants were made available to youth gangs on New York's East Side. "I had never heard anything quite like it," Richard Poston writes. "This, it seemed to me, was one of the most significant social phenomena yet to emerge out of the urban despair of the sixties."

His investigations, however, reveal that "I, along with a good many people who effect the annual distribution of millions of dollars of grant funds, had been taken in by an incredible job of myth-making."

Research professor at Southern Illinois University and a pioneer in the field of community development, the author maintains that the negative results might have been avoided by a more realistic, less romantic approach by "the establishment." His book is important to all concerned with the nation's urban problems.

At all bookstores, $7.95

Harper & Row 49 East 33d Street, New York 10016

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spontaneous, either in art or the making or deployment of tools?").

Father Berrigan remains one of the major spokesmen of the Christian Left, and as such he deserves attention. The change in attitude in recent years is rather frightening. It started out with a position that was pacifist, which it equated with nonviolence (the former is philosophical, the latter is political). Somewhere along the line the position became thoroughly political, though still calling itself theological. Gradually, it has moved from being pacifist in opposing the war, to being nonviolent in opposing the Federal Government, to being sympathetic to the enemies of that Government, to approving of those enemies. Thus, Father Berrigan can muse: "To take up weapons is to lose one's choice of weapons. Men who take up the sword, die by the sword." That is Biblically grounded (if hardly original), and a pacifist could make out a very good case for it. But then, on the very next page, the author can wonder if violence is ever permissible. Well, maybe, "provided he is first of all a peaceable man, a man of his people. Guevara, Ho, Castro." One would have to assume, if one were logical, that the



hundreds of thousands of Berrigan's co-religionists in North Vietnam and Cuba who headed for other places did so because *they* were violent, and indeed, even wicked for opposing (peacefully) these "men of the people."

The Dark Night of Resistance deserves reading, insofar as it is a case study of what we are in for. It is not so much a flight from reality, as it is an attempt to create a new reality which is an inversion of all that the Jewish, Christian and Western traditions have held up in the name of "value." If there are values which you do not like, reject them. If there are laws which you do not like, break them and then object when you are dragged off under "the frosty eye of power."

It is worth noting that the Council of Nicaea, in 325 A.D., forbade the deliberate seeking of martyrdom. □

The Anarchist Cookbook
By William Powell
Lyle Stuart, 160 pp., $5.95

RECIPES FOR DESTRUCTION

MAX GELTMAN

Peter Bergman's first sentence of the introduction to this extravagant "cookbook" sums up its contents admirably: "This is a brutal book—sensual, rude, cruel and coarse." It is all that and more—it is a manual of terror that makes Carlos Marighela's *Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare* a petty affair indeed.

This is actually the *second* anarchist "cookbook" to appear in less than a hundred years in this country, the first being Johann Most's *Revolutionäre Kriegswissenschaft* (I give the rest of the mouth-filling Teutonic title in English:—*A Handbook of Instruction Regarding the Use of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Guncotton, Fulminating Mercury, Bombs, Arson, Poisons, etc.*). Emma Goldman once whipped him at a public meeting on the lower East Side of New York, he pleading, "Don't hit me, Emma, *bitte*. I'm a good comrade." This should help to answer the question: What happens when government-less anarchists fall out? He (or she) who bears the whip will determine what law and order to obey, as Karl Hess will yet learn to his sorrow, he beginning in his middle years where the old IWW left off.

THE NEW "cookbook" is not only brought up to date, it contains recipes that the earlier chef never dreamed of in his wildest nightmares. The crude old poisons have been replaced by a score of recipes for such psychedelic delights as a simple marijuana joint and such sophisticated mind-benders as Psilocin and Psilocybin as well as the powerful and synthetic DMT for instant hallucination. If, however, you've had an elementary course in high school chemistry you can easily follow the formulas for making almost any kind of explosive and instrument of destruction, from a simple Molotov cocktail before dinner, to such main dishes as how to blow up an apartment house, a factory, a bank, a whole city block—or the Pentagon itself.

In good clear precise English, and with measurements carefully indicated (as a proper recipe should), you can learn to make, say, Mercury Fulminate, "the prime ingredient in most blasting caps and detonating devices." I offer as a singular example, both of the style and the method, the following recipe from among the 139 in the book:

"1. Take 5 grains of pure mercury and mix with 35 ml. of nitric acid.
2. The mixture is slowly heated. As soon as the solution bubbles and turns green . . ."

Here I stop to whet your appetite, so to speak, and to invite you into the book (if you have a taste for such things) where you will find the other mouth-watering recipes which have become the envy of the ladies in Scarsdale where (I have been informed) the biggest sales have been recorded.

PERHAPS IT WILL come as a surprise to some of the disaffected libertarians of the youthful Right to find that the book opens with a quotation from Johann Most and ends with a quotation from their special folk-hero, Robert Heinlein (*The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress*). One lesson the book teaches (inadvertently, of course) is that extreme libertarianism leads ineluctably to absolute excesses, all in the name of the struggle for an abstract freedom that unites under one banner the old-world anarchists, Bakunin, Most, Kropotkin and Proudhon, as well as the social revolutionaries Marx and Lenin and pacifists and civil disobedients such as Thoreau and Tolstoy, with disaffected Jeffersonian and uniquely American anarchists like Benjamin Tucker and Wendell Phillips.

Mr. Bergman is dead right in equating anarchism with nihilism and nihilism with all forms of violent revolutionary action. "I believe in the approach Marx took toward the different forms of revolutionary struggles," he writes, adding: "Marx and Lenin consented to be true Anarchists when they preached, 'As long as there is the state there is no freedom; when there is freedom there will be no state' (Lenin)."

Not that Lenin is any more right here than was Wendell Phillips who told the boys at Harvard, "Nihilism is righteous and honorable; Nihilism is evidence of life," nor more ethically libertarian than was Benjamin Tucker who taught that the triumph of true individual freedom will be upon us when a man will be able to pass by unconcerned—minding his business—when a

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
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rape or murder is committed before his eyes.

We have come a long way from the original "cookbook" with its primitive formulas for making guncotton to the making of napalm—in the kitchen.

But the question remains: Why is the making of such books as Most's and the *Anarchist Cookbook* uniquely an American phenomenon? It is possible the answer lies in our past. Perhaps it all began with the Jeffersonian conundrum that that government is best that governs least.

We have since learned—or should have—that governments that refuse to govern firmly and fairly soon invite anarchy in the streets. I suggest that conservatives need to do some rethinking on the nature of the state if we are not to get bogged down in the Marxist-Leninist syndrome which sees the state as *only* an instrument of oppression. *Our* state, please note, not *theirs*. There is surely more to the state—to government—than oppression, for without it men "would soon swallow each other alive like beasts." This is a longtime truth. It is almost two thousand years old. That is what is meant, or should be, when we talk about respect for the "permanent things," chief among them being the preservation of the state as long as it fulfills the function of providing that protection which is best for the most of us—so long as the rights of the minority are protected in all ways to assure not only civil peace, but that tranquility without which civility in the commonwealth is impossible. □

BOOKS IN BRIEF

DESTROY OR DIE, *The True Story of Mylai, by Martin Gershen (Arlington, 325 pp., $7.95). Destroy or Die* is not a particularly well-written book—a hasty expansion of some earlier articles by Mr. Gershen. But it is a powerful one. More than anything else I have read, Mr. Gershen's account of the Mylai incident gives a real insight into what happened and why. As such, it is very depressing reading; the sad story of a riff-raff company, ill-trained and, in the case of Lt. Calley, ill-led. After being picked to pieces by an unprincipled guerrilla enemy, it finally cracked up, imitating Vietcong savagery for a few bloody minutes on March 16, 1968. Sordid is the word: sordid war; sordid episode; sordid opportunists on the Left and Right who have tried to exploit it. Fortunately, Mr. Gershen is an honest-to-God war correspondent, not one of the journalist/scavengers who have fattened on the anguish of Mylai. He tells his story in the style of Ernie Pyle or the late Jim Lucas, tinged with an understandable bitterness. His portrait of Captain Medina, an admirable man and a first-class officer, and the day-to-day account of Charlie Company's destruction as a functioning fighting unit (which occured as a prelude to the Mylai episode) are well handled, and he has caught the senseless frenzy of the slaughter itself in simple, indelible prose. "The tragedy of Mylai cannot be condoned," Mr. Gershen writes, but his graphic, factual account of the event and its preliminaries is probably *the most honest, useful piece of writing* generated by this wretched episode—and an insight into *why* it happened. Having read it, I find it even more difficult than before to listen to the glib indictments of the doves and the equally noxious ranting of the Calley fans. Both factions should shut up, read Mr. Gershen's book, and ask themselves some serious questions.

A. BAKSHIAN JR.

BROADWAY, *by Brooks Atkinson (Macmillan, 484 pp., $12.50).* This survey of the Broadway theater during our century of necessity has something of a nostalgic air. Broadway has fallen on evil days—fewer plays, fewer hits, fewer theaters. Atkinson, the tolerant and amiable former theater critic of the *New York Times,* has a feeling for the buildings and the people and the era. Though his scope is not encyclopedic, he writes with the double authority of one who was a part of the Broadway milieu and who liked it.

R. CRINKLEY

THE MARQUIS DE CUSTINE AND HIS RUSSIA IN 1839, *by George F. Kennan (Princeton, 145 pp., $5.00).* When an English version of Arshine's *La Russie en 1839* was published two decades ago, it was given the title *Journey for Our Time* and was prefaced by some salutary remarks from the pen of a recent U.S. Ambassador to the USSR. As Mr. Kennan points out here, "even if we admit that *La Russie en 1839* was not a very good book about Russia in 1839, we are confronted with the disturbing fact that it was an excellent book . . . about the Russia of Josef Stalin, and not a bad book about the Russia of Brezhnev and Kosygin." Unlike Tocqueville, who saw both the strengths and weaknesses of American society, Custine saw only (or very nearly so) the weaknesses of the Russian, for reasons Mr. Kennan gives in some detail. But then, the weaknesses were there—they gave rise in due time to the modern Russian police state—and one is pleased to find the sometimes ambivalent Mr. Kennan concluding this (incidentally, quite interesting) book with the words "it is [the present rulers of Russia] who must face the question as to whether Custine's strictures were or were not—are or are not—without force."

C. S. HORN

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Arts & Manners

PLACES

J. BRYAN III

Necropolis

The Taj Mahal by moonlight is one of the stalest clichés in tourism. Yet certain sights do, or *should*, impose special visiting hours. Assuredly, you should time your first view of the Grand Canyon for sunrise, when the shadows make a sudden, league-long leap, then slowly shorten, like a broad-jumper in reverse. Go to the Colosseum on a summer noon, when the heat and glare will help repeople it with the roaring, bloodthirsty mob of its heydays. The Tower of London demands an evening of "death-dumb, autumn-dripping gloom," when spectres of heedless queens and headless heroes, and little princes long, long dead, swirl from the fog and melt into it again. Most exigent of all is the Arc de Triomphe, which has not only its finest season, day and hour, but a finest *moment*. To grasp it, you must station yourself by the obelisk in the Place de la Concorde, just before sunset on a fifth of May, and look westward. Presently the declining sun will perfectly fill the Arch, in a tribute—no less impressive for being fortuitous—to the demigod who commissioned it and who died on May 5, 1821.

APROPOS OF DEATH and Paris, the pilgrimage I repeat most often there is to Père Lachaise cemetery. It is one of my favorite haunts (if you will forgive the word). I find its attractions as various as its tenants and as endless as their sleep. I have wandered miles of its quiet *allées*, at all seasons and all times of day; and I have come to believe that the best combination is a sunny morning in April. The spring rains will have washed the sooty stones; the resident pigeons will be flaunting their livelier iris; and the trees will be freshly green, especially the weeping willow that Alfred de Musset begged for in his poem "Lucie":

Mes bons amis, quand je mourrai,
Plantez un saule au cimetière!

Père Lachaise has willows, cedars, cypresses and other funereal shrubs aplenty, yet on such a morning it is somehow spared the melancholy they usually exude. *Morne et triste*? Far from it! We buffs even know where to find little jests—for example, Géricault's tomb, with its bas-reliefs, on one of which the mischievous sculptor, Etex, modeled a cavalry charger with a girl's leg. Or the high relief of the Comte de la Valette changing costumes with his wife, which might easily be a scene from a French bedroom farce, if you weren't aware that it is actually one of thrilling melodrama. The jest I myself liked best was not in the cemetery proper, but just opposite, on the rue du Repos, where used to stand a bistro named Mieux Ici Qu'en Face—"Better Here Than across the Way." I remember the Mieux Ici affectionately. It was a cheery place for a hot toddy when a shower had overtaken me among the tombs. I would become so absorbed in tracking down some minor celebrity (like Queen Victoria's father's mistress), or puzzling over a quaint inscription (like ICI REPOSENT LES DEUX FRERES, nameless, dateless), or enjoying a chance-found oddity (like the eerie silhouettes of two Halloween bats, cut in the door of the Gaumont tomb), that I would barely escape a drenching and the consequent chill that might qualify me willy-nilly as one of good Father Lachaise's permanent guests.

They now total about nine hundred thousand. So many bodies on a scant 116 acres would seem to represent a supersaturation worse than the direst prediction of our doom-crying demographers, but an idle stroller receives no impression of crowdedness. Seeing the enormous mausoleum reserved for the exclusive occupancy of Princess Démidoff, he might never suspect what we buffs know, that beneath many of these *allées* are catacombs and ossuaries heaped with bones in a jackstraw-jumble. One short ditch holds the remains of the 871 Communards who fell in a grisly tomb-to-tomb battle here on May 27, 1871, plus the 147 prisoners whom the government stood against a wall at dawn next morning. (It was the second battle on the same site; the first had been in March 1814 when the Allies stormed Paris and the Russians stormed Père Lachaise.) Lastly, many of the small tombs, scarcely larger than a telephone booth, are entrances to deep crypts lined with caskets by the

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dozen. A certain Raymond Roussel, a passionate checkers-player, managed to lease a vault with room for 31 additional occupants, on the plea that a game of checkers requires 32 pieces. Considering those bone-piles and those crypts with their sub-sub-basements, Père Lachaise begins to seem less a cemetery than a termitary.

If you are making your first visit, ask a *gardien* at the main gate for a map showing the most illustrious graves. Chopin is on it, and Marshal Ney, Balzac, Oscar Wilde, Sarah Bernhardt, Edith Piaf, Rachel, Proust, Delacroix, Colette, Daudet and many, many others. At least these few you should see before you set out on your own. A stone maiden with a lyre mourns for Chopin, though she should be enjoying the bouquets so often left for him. When you come to Balzac, remember that his young Rastignac looked out over Paris from just here, in *Père Goriot*'s closing scene, and cried, *"A nous deux maintenant!"* Poor Oscar Wilde, the airiest, nimblest of triflers, lies crushed under a ponderous stone monster, Epstein's "flying demon-angel" (his own description), so uglily explicit that fetishists cannot resist caressing it. A block of gray marble inscribed FAMILLE GASTON-PIAF marks the grave of the beloved little gutter-snipe singer, and of the stuffed rabbit, lion and squirrel that were buried with her; 25,000 adoring fans followed her casket here. Marcel Proust's black granite and Colette's pink sandstone announce their names, nothing more; and the six letters RACHEL are the great tragedienne's sole but undisputed billing. The meagrest information of all comes from a small stone so nearly enfolded by roots that only "D 9" can now be read. Père Lachaise's buffs want to know more about D 9. They also want more information on a neighbor of Rachel's, one Jacob Roblès. They have the dates and places of his birth and death, but can't unearth a single other fact. *"L'Inconnu,"* they call him. So "the brave, the beautiful, the proud, sleep on," but beside them sleep—and doubtless no less soundly—names without histories, and numbers without even names.

Do I seem to suggest that simplicity and modesty prevail at Père Lachaise? I do not mean to. For every RACHEL *tout court*, I can show you two such orgulous concatenations as ALI BIN HAMUD BIN MUHAMMAD BIN SAID BIN SULTAN BIN AL-IMAN SULTAN DE ZANZIBAR. Suppliant in death as few sultans ever were in life, he begs God to have pity on him. For every Antoine-Louis Barye, content with the brief label STATUAIRE, you find two cockalorums like Georges Visinet, who insists on reminding us that he was once "Director-Administrator of the St. Germain-en-Laye Gas Company, former President of the Technical Society of the French Gas Industry, President of the Vigilance Committee of the Lebon Gas Company, and drama and music critic of the Havas Agency and the Rouen Journal." But even Visinet seems reticent when you encounter M. Lenoir-Dufresne's vaunt that "more than five thousand workmen whom his genius had fed and his example encouraged, came to weep on this tomb for a father and a friend." And for every austere stone like Proust's or Colette's, there are two like Commander da Machado's: a plinth supporting four turtles which in turn support a pyramid displaying on its four sides an ibis, a bullock, a cat and a sunburst, the whole crowned with a gigantic egg. Antoine-Augustin Parmentier, the agriculturist who brought the potato to France, offers us another sculpture gallery, with sheaves of wheat and corn, a basket of potatoes, a grapevine, a plough and a pot still . . . Me, I would have considered *potage Parmentier* a sufficient memorial.

By far the most popular tomb in the whole cemetery is Allan Kardec's. It is not impressive, merely a crude stone shed: a big, thick slab resting on two front pillars and a backwall. A pedestal with Kardec's bust stands against the backwall and a heavy iron chain encloses the three open sides. That is all. Yet any weekday this shrine—for a shrine it certainly is—draws a crowd of two hundred, and any Sunday five hundred; and on the first Sunday in April, which is the Sunday after the anniversary of Kardec's death in 1869, it draws thousands. As you may have guessed, Kardec was a spiritist. Members of his cult believe that if they bring him a little gift and touch the chain, their prayer will be granted. They come from all over Western Europe and even from Brazil, where they are particularly strong. Some bring medals, some bring money, but most bring little bouquets; any flower will do except marigolds, because it is well known that "the Master does not like marigolds." The pilgrims wait their turn in line, and when they finally reach the shed (it may take hours), they face the bust, lay their flowers at the foot of the pedestal, whisper their prayer, then touch the chain and leave, springy-stepped and assured. I have seen them often.

Between the spiritists at Kardec's tomb and the fetishists at Wilde's, a good deal of touching and rubbing goes on at Père Lachaise. One other tomb, Victor Noir's, also invites it. Noir was a journalist who was brutally shot down in a political squabble in 1870, and is here portrayed in his death-pose: a sprawling, full-length effigy in bronze, shirt collar burst open, trousers partly unbuttoned, and beside him his top hat, arrested by the sculptor in mid-roll. I find the figure extremely dramatic; others find it inspirational. "Although the green patina is now almost black," says one of my guidebooks, "a certain part of the body shines brightly, thanks to the caresses of sterile women." It adds, "How extraordinary that an assassinated journalist should be the object of such attention!"

As a member of that lowly, unloved profession, I must agree. □

FILM

DAVID BRUDNOY

Iris' Head, Eric's Knee, Milos' Gap

"You are going to try to be lucid and honest," the cartoon-deep psychoanalyst intones repeatedly in an exceedingly dreary, faintly amateurish film gutted out of Iris Murdoch's smashingly arch little novel, *A Severed Head*. *Head* concerns wine merchant Martin Lynch-Gibbon (Ian Holm, a rare find) whose pretty mistress (Jennie Linden), flighty wife, studsy-sculptor brother and analyst-best friend (Richard Attenborough) confound his decidedly petulant determination to keep everyone in his and her place in his, Martin's, neatly compartmentalized life. Alas poor Martin when the swapping starts: Martin's wife to analyst to Martin's brother; Martin's mistress to Martin's brother to analyst; and Martin? Martin to mistress to wife

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to—hoo *ha*—analyst's bitchy half-sister, an Oxford don (donness?), Honor Klein, a dour incestuess with a taste for samurai swords. Whoosh. Whoosh.

A Severed Head is a superb book: crisp vignettes, sharp character etchings, wit and polish and grace. Miss Murdoch teamed with J. B. Priestley for a lackluster stage version, and this, muddied further for the screen, now gallumphs along from bed to bed to snippy little confrontation to Teuton-leaden revelation to deep-Freud symbolic slices (See the wine spilled on the floor in the bed chamber? See castrating Honor wield that sword at poor cuckolded Martin?) to its so-what-else-is-new ending. So very many combinations in so short a time, and so many stock would-be comedy shticks long since grown stale, do little but expose sharply the shallowness of this film. Lee Remick is simply dreadful as Martin's wife Antonia; she crinkles her nose and scowls and drips eye water and bores one silly. And worse, the waste of beautiful Claire Bloom as Honor Klein is scandalous. Honor is, well, a hell of a woman. In the novel she lends a brooding, physically ugly, pivotal presence to the extra- and intra-marital hijinks, but in the movie she just hovers and vamps.

NOWHERE near as flawed is Milos Forman's first American film, *Taking Off*. It was a happy notion, Forman's generation-gaping examination of parents whose teen-agers flee home in the summer to flap their wings in Greenwich Village. Some of Forman's casting is perfect, especially Buck Henry and Lynn Carlin as the parents of the girl who takes off, and Vincent Schiavelli as a head who demonstrates proper grass blowing procedures to the upper-middle-class Society for Parents of Fugitive Children (SPFC).

The film could have been worse. Remember Antonioni's disastrous first (last, if we're lucky) attempt to do an American film, *Zabriskie Point*. Forman is obviously not as much at home here as in his native Czechoslovakia; see his *Loves of a Blond* if it comes around again. Perhaps because of this unfamiliarity with America, *Taking Off* relies rather overmuch on caricature, and there are some just plain wrong scenes. These include the way-too-rapid stoning of the SPFC (it doesn't *ever* happen after the first six drags), the uneven quality of Buck Henry's screen character, the unlikely adult strip-poker game and so on. Scenes get out of hand and we feel for Forman, wishing he knew our mores better. But other scenes are fine, like the Village audition for singers to which the daughter goes, a bundle of nerves hoping to become tomorrow's Miss Superfolkstar, and that in which she totes her hip musician boyfriend home to Scarsdale, or wherever, for dinner. *Taking Off* doesn't quite take off, but there's enough good to justify seeing it some muggy night.

It's summer, the sky's blue, the livin's easy, a young man's fancy turns to nice legs and why ever not? Now's the season to enjoy with author-director Eric Rohmer another chapter in his Six Moral Tales. *Claire's Knee*, the fifth in this film series, is captivatingly unfashionable. People talk, oh how they talk: philosophy, art, life. They sip cocktails and coffee, play volleyball, talk, gaze at one another, bask in the sun, talk, flirt and cruise, talk some more. You get the picture. It sounds rather dreary on paper, but works beautifully on film.

Jérôme (Jean-Claude Brialy), 35, just about to marry his mistress, pops down from his diplomatic post in Sweden to his childhood lakeside home for a few weeks, there meeting an old friend, a Rumanian novelist, and through her, two teen-age girls. First Laura, dark, early blooming, a coy protonymphet. Then her half-sister Claire, older, exquisite, with a sinewy boyfriend and no eye at all for Jérôme. But Jérôme has a "little interest" in Claire, not a passion, he tells his friend the novelist, but a little interest. In what? In her knee, which her callow boyfriend casually touches one afternoon. Jérôme manages eventually to place his fingers on Claire's knee for a few minutes. That's all. Then off he goes, contentedly, to marry his fiancée.

The film is all skin, no bones or meat. Rohmer's hand dances over the surface of the matter of minor temptation checked by higher morality. He's snug in his Catholic faith, and his film has a quality of contentment increasingly rare these days. *Knee* is as fresh and lovely as Laurence de Monaghan, the girl who plays Claire. It is secure in its stylishness, calmly correct. It is light but deliberately, expertly, refreshingly light, conducive to indulgence. *Claire's Knee* is as nice as that nice little Beaujolais that's so pleasant any time, especially of a summer afternoon. □

VIDEO

MARTIN WILLIAMS

So Long, Clown

NBC made it official last March: The *Red Skelton Show* will not be part of the 1971-72 season. And that, I think, is a sizable loss. Although he is one of our most frustratingly erratic and uneven performers, Red Skelton is also one of the most individually gifted comics we have. More important perhaps, he is one of a handful of performers who have not only discovered the true nature and resources of their own talents on TV, but have also uncovered something about the unique nature of the medium itself, and have extended our appreciation of what can and can't be done on the home screen.



Skelton spent half a career in films as a popular second-stringer, a kind of studio-contrived wise guy and would-be quipmaster. It didn't work very well, but occasionally the real Skelton would show through even in the movies, and the real Skelton was a rubbery, unkempt, apparently clumsy but secretly graceful low-comedy clown. On TV, this real Skelton grew and blossomed.

Skelton might assume the character of country bumkin Clem Kadiddlehopper, or henpecked George Appleby, or clown-tramp Freddy the Freeloader, or inept Sheriff Deadeye, or another of his characters. Even so, he was still Red, ad-libbing whenever he wished to, trying goodnaturedly to break up the other cast members, making into-the-camera asides, deliberately squinting toward the cue cards should he make a mistake (or pretending to chew out the page for holding one upside down).

Such extreme casualness, Skelton has shown us, can be quite acceptable on TV. Indeed, with the planets in the right conjunction, it might be brilliantly entertaining. No other medium could handle such offhandedness. Put it on a stage and the audience would walk out.

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Put it on film? Unthinkable! Yet on TV, it can be one of a good performer's chief comic resources. And not only for Skelton himself. Dean Martin, for one, shows us week after week that such a casual, offhanded approach can be personally developed to convey quite a different personality and be a source of different comic effects.

In discovering all this, Skelton was working not so much out of his experience in movies, as he was working out of his experience in radio and using the characters and the pacing he had learned to use on his radio shows.

You can't do pantomime on radio, however. So Skelton's raucous pantomimes might seem to contradict all this. I am not so sure. They are as seemingly casual, offhanded and semi-improvisational as his sketches, for one thing. They are also as intimate. Skelton learned that, much as acting on film has to be taken down several emotional notches from acting on stage, TV performing has to come down several notches still. It has to be much more direct and intimate On stage, after all, one is communicating to a houseful, from front row to back gallery. In movies, the camera crowds in on the actor, but the audience may still be spread out over a city block. On TV, not only is the camera four feet off, the audience virtually sits in your lap. And on radio, the mike had been in your face and the listener a few feet away.

For Red the clown, everything that can possibly go wrong always does. As a surgeon, he shows up drunk, sneezes all over his sterile hands when the antiseptic powder is introduced, and is appalled, then outraged, then delighted by what he discovers on the inside once he has made a wide slice across the imaginary patient's abdomen. As a home handyman, Red bangs his thumb, saws off a couple of fingers and lets his hammer's head fly through the nearest plate glass window. And as "The Old Man Watching a Parade," Skelton kept his sentimentality controlled at the level of moving, effective pathos.

Ousted by CBS after eighteen seasons high in the ratings (the network claimed it wanted to change its down-home, bucolic image), Skelton found a temporary, uncomfortable refuge on NBC this past season as a 7:30 lead-in to the *Laugh In* show. It didn't work. As I say, the loss is ours. And one can hope that Red Skelton will be back, and soon. □

EXPOSED!

WALTER CRONKITE
(AS TOLD TO WM. GAVIN)

The Brinkley-Vanocur-Mudd-Reynolds Conspiracy

CONSPIRACY ADMITTED;
AGNEW, VANOCUR INDICTED:
DOCUMENTS UNCOVERED

New York (AP)—Vice President Spiro T. Agnew admitted today that he was the mastermind behind the conspiracy to destroy the credibility of the American press.

"I did it and I'm glad," snarled Agnew to reporters as he was taken from the modest ranch-style suburban New Jersey home now known to have been the headquarters of the conspiracy. "Ever since I was a young man I've wanted to destroy the credibility of the press."

Indicted along with Agnew were television evening news anchor-men David Brinkley and John Chancellor and newsmen Roger Mudd (in Washington), Morley Saffer (in Vietnam) and Sander Vanocur, alleged co-conspirators with Agnew.

Secret documents alluded to in a speech made by Walter Cronkite* have been uncovered. Each document was labeled "TOP SECRET MEDIA CONSPIRACY DOCUMENT" and was found in a cupboard behind the knotty-pine bar in the basement of the conspiracy headquarters.

Vanocur said today that the suburban home was used because it was the kind of place in which television newsmen felt most at home.

"I know I have something of a reputation as a liberal," said Vanocur, "but now at last I can tell the truth about Ted Agnew. I love that guy, really love him. We all did. That's why we entered into this foul conspiracy. But I'd do it again for Ted. It was hard to sit there every night, blasting Agnew and Nixon when our hearts were with them all the way. There were times when I barely could stop myself from saying what I really felt about the Big Guy—as we call him—and how great he is. But he made us swear that we'd keep abusing him on the tube in order that he could have a chance to make his little speeches."

Reliable sources claim that part of the conspiracy was to have Agnew's numerous supporters in the media pretend to be anti-Agnew so that he could publicly denounce them in speeches and eventually gain control of the airwaves for his own nefarious purposes. Rumors that he wanted to have all of prime-time hours filled with re-runs of *Gilligan's Island* have not been confirmed or denied by Agnew's office.

David Brinkley disclosed for the first time the true story of Chet Huntley's dismissal from NBC.

"Make no mistake about it," said Brinkley, "Chet knew too much and he had to go. Unlike most of us here at NBC, Chet was a bit to the left in his political views and the conspiracy would not have worked if he continued the evenhanded coverage typical of liberals. What we needed was someone who was a member of the inner-circle. Chet was finally asked to leave by Julian Goodman, another crypto-Agnewian, and that was that."

THE PLOT used various codes. When Agnew made a major speech the conspirators would gather in the basement of the suburban home, drink beer from cans, eat pretzels and otherwise engage in "middle-America" rituals, which their daily jobs and their undercover work prevented them from engaging in. When Agnew came on television each would wait for a secret signal in order to be able to carry out his part in the conspiracy.

"I always waited for Ted's alliteration," said Frank Reynolds. "When he said nittering nabobs I'd look it up in my secret codebook and then I'd know what to say the next day."

Earlier in the day, Robert Welch, head of the John Birch Society, made known that group's plan to bestow upon Walter Cronkite their annual Conspiracy Uncovering Award, the Titus Oates Medal with Poison Oak Leaf Cluster.

"Wally Cronkite is a fine conspiracy-uncovering American," said Welch. "I always knew there was a conspiracy someplace and Wally found it." □

**New York* (AP)—Walter Cronkite said today "Many of us see a clear indication on the part of this Administration of a grand conspiracy to destroy the credibility of the press."
"Short of uncovering documents which probably do not exist, it is impossible to know precisely the motives of this conspiracy," Cronkite said.

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STROTHER
(Continued from page 812)

titude, the engineers are working to produce a quieter deployment. They are by no means confident that it can be done without sacrificing speed.

The savants also are concerned with the long-term effects of a subconscious fear that the device might blast off at any time. Is that likely to do for motorists' nerves what the lurking presence of Nazi submarines did to the nerves of crewmen on munitions ships during World War II? The investigators would also like to know more about the safety of a bottle containing 3,500 pounds of air. Might it go off like a bomb if a car catches fire? Will fear of that kind of explosion hamper rescue efforts after a crash?

One among the hundreds of physiological tests being run by GM especially intrigued reporters. In it a professional dived 37 feet into a sponge rubber pad "with a biaxial accelerometer attached to his chest at mid-sternum," a corporation announcement said, adding, "He suffered no discomfort." The test confirmed that the human body can take a lot of pounding against yielding surfaces.

And might not a passenger be hurt when he bounced back off an air-cushion safety device? The tests indicated that he might, so the airbag was designed with porous nylon side panels which begin to deflate rapidly after the crash. The bag is no sooner inflated than it starts to go down again, the weight of the passenger's body assisting the process.

Among other hazards still unsolved is that presented by out-of-position passengers. Might not a child standing on the seat, for example, be knocked down and hurt by the sudden deployment?

There is also the problem of how to give the driver the same protection as that provided front-seat passengers. The main airbag does not reach him, and the engineers are working on a separate bag which, if all goes well, will shoot out of the steering wheel! They concede the possibility that with the device in front of his face he might plough into other cars, thus creating conditions conducive of a multiple accident.

Most of the proving-ground tests have involved simulated head-on collisions. Conditions that may arise in side, rear and roll-over accidents, as well as in multiple-car collisions, are still under study. Engineers believe the rear-seat system will have to be hung from the car roof, but have only begun to figure out how. Plainly there is a long way to go before the system—front or rear—is ready.

While tests proceed, an entire airbag manufacturing industry is being created at a cost GM estimates at a half billion dollars. Production tools are being designed, factory space built and workers taught to make the bags. An army of service people must be trained to keep the systems in operating condition in all kinds of climatic conditions over long periods of time. Car designers, foreign and domestic, are trying urgently to figure out where to put the airbag components in vehicles that lack space for the components they already have. Harassed service managers in dealerships all over the country are preparing to tear their remaining hair out when airbag service problems flock in upon their overloaded facilities.

Will the airbag work well enough to justify all the enormous expense in money and time? It should be recognized that it will not *prevent* traffic accidents—it is not designed to do that—and nobody denies that it will inevitably cause some accidents itself by going off in false-alarm situations. It may prevent injury in some traffic mishaps, and reduce the severity of injuries in others. But that is about the most that can be claimed for it, providing, even then, that the system can be brought to the state of perfection the engineers hope to achieve.

The auto industry, as it usually does with new accessories, had planned to introduce the airbag safety system as an option to customers willing to pay for it. Experience in actual practice would have proved, or disproved, its worth. The system could have been improved gradually as its popularity grew

That traditional approach seems to many far more sensible than the abrupt federal ukase compelling every new car buyer to spend a still unknown but certainly large sum of money for an unproved protective device, whether he wants it or not.

President Nixon has said he opposes needless use of the government's coercive powers. Since the industry cannot meet the deadline for compulsory introduction of the new air cushion safety system anyhow, the FHSB will be obliged to extend it. The delay will give some 83 million motorists—almost all of them voters—a welcome chance to make their views known on a ruling that so greatly concerns them.

One hopeful development would be that the mere threat of being forced to install costly inflatable air bladders in their cars will lead them to fasten their seat belts. The whole vast "passive restraint" project would never have come up if they had done that in the first place. □

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

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Solution to Last Issue's Trans-O-Gram

[Ivo] Duchacek:
[*Czechoslovakia,*] *The Classic Maneuver*

In a free society the Communist Party resembles the Roman deity Janus: It has two faces, one seemingly peaceful and speaking of coexistence; the other, masked and hidden from public view, is conspiritorial and subversive.

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LETTERS

(Continued from page 787)

"How about It, Gnomes?" ["The Week," June 1] one is forced to speak up. Never have I seen such blithering nonsense soiling the pages of your magazine before.

Let us address ourselves to the supercilious question, what does prevent Europeans from using the excess dollar balances to purchase interests in American industry? Since your economic scribbler does not know, permit me to enlighten him.

The excess dollars are mostly owned by European banks and by American banks located in Europe, as well as by major international companies, mostly American. These entities are not in the business of using their funds for buying participations in American equities. An excellent reason for this is that most of the American corporations already own American industry. How astonishingly naïve to ask Standard Oil of Germany to use its excess dollars to purchase shares in the U.S. Of what? Of Standard Oil again? Banks are not generally in the business of buying participations. They are merchants of money and their commitments in their stock of trade, namely money, are usually short-term.

Why Volkswagen, which has an excellent business in the world, should purchase, nay, even start a takeover fight for, a company such as American Motors, appears to be a reasonable proposition only in the mind of your budding economics minister.

If the prospects of participation in American equities were so outstanding that the world marketplace wanted to purchase a share in American industry, then the proposition contained in the article would make some sense. It is therefore up to your writer, in handling this editorial question, to propagandize the powers in Washington and American industry to make their shares interesting and to assure a continuation of conditions that would entice the so-called gnomes to join them in ownership.

I therefore suggest that instead of pursuing policies which were long ago tried, i.e., palming off on the holder of U.S. funds meaningless equity participations, an over-all financial and trade policy would be more sensible.

Wantagh, N.Y. PAUL S. SELBY

If we deciphered reader Selby's prose correctly, we share his view of what the long-run solution to the ills of the dollar should be. But the question raised in the editorial (what should European central bankers do with their excess dollars?) is neither supercilious nor silly, adjectives which might be better used to describe parts of our faithful reader's letter. To date, central bankers have been able to do nothing more imaginative than investing them in New York, or throwing them back onto the commercial Eurodollar market, two courses of action which tend to increase, rather than diminish, the over-all problem. We simply suggested that the European central bankers, acting in concert with local firms and financiers, buy out some of the American corporations about which they complain so bitterly. —ED.

Conservative Ecology

In the editorial "Let There Be Darkness" ["The Week," May 18] you sound off once more to castigate the environmental crusaders. Ever since the Left took up the conservationist cause, you have been knocking it. Now, you should know that when the steam has died down in this direction, the anarchists will pick up another "cause." However, the problems remain and will multiply unless the rape of our planet can be stopped.

I do not know what the right solution for Consolidated Edison may be. It does appear at present that they are being asked to do the impossible. If you have driven recently down the Hutchinson River Parkway toward the Whitestone Bridge you have seen those monstrous buildings for thousands of families, all of them wanting air-conditioning, TV, electric stoves etc.

I am convinced that any long-term solution will have to include less prodigal use of the resources we have. But who will regulate this? The specter you raise, of government intervention, is frightening, but I think it is a distortion, unworthy of *NR*, to imply that that is what all the crusaders have in mind. Some do, but one should not confuse a serious cause with its misuse by opportunists.

On the question of Storm King Mountain, I have been opposed to its use as a storage facility for water ever since the idea was proposed. For one thing, the rock formation is not all that solid in the southeast corner of New York State. Storm King is a bit tricky geologically, we are told, and the weight of all those millions of gallons of water . . . As to the few fish you mention, poor things, their days are numbered anyway, but it is not just the fish, it is the pouring of heated water into a river that is generally out of ecological balance. Have we the right to totally ruin what the good Lord gave us? It was not quite cricket, either, not to mention where the proposed storage facility, pumping station and plant would be. The Storm King area on the Hudson is one of the loveliest stretches of river in the world. It is more than "a location on the Hudson River." And, disguise it as they will, the power plant will hardly improve the scenery!

New Haven, Conn. HOPE M. KIRKPATRICK

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WM. F. BUCKLEY JR.

The POWs and the Professor

On The Right

New York, July 8—Two months ago Mr. Nixon said that he would not order the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam until several goals had been achieved, among them the return of American prisoners of war. It was instantly apparent that the return of American POWs was not being put forward by Mr. Nixon as the concession in return for which we would instantly pull out.

Another way of putting it is: if Hanoi were to say, tomorrow, that it would release our prisoners if we would agree to withdraw our fighting men, our Navy and our Air Force the day after tomorrow, Mr. Nixon would reply that no, this is hardly what he is talking about. Our purposes in Vietnam, sound or unsound, are serious even beyond the solemn commitment we have to the repatriation of our POWs. If it were they exclusively that we had it in mind to worry about, we would not have gone to Vietnam in the first place, or continue, at this point, to press our goals in Vietnam, sacrificing lives week after week.

Simpletons reason that if Mr. Nixon, at this point, worries only about the prisoners of war, why does he not announce a date for withdrawal, whereupon Hanoi will surely announce that on that date, we will get back our prisoners of war. Opportunists are using the POWs for insidious polemical purposes. They are propagating the myth that President Nixon has asked Hanoi to do the impossible thing, namely to return the POWs, precisely because he desires to set a condition that obviously Hanoi cannot meet. That way, they reason (to use the kindest word for it), Nixon can continue his war against North Vietnam under the guise of fulfilling a commitment, not to a grand strategy based on meeting American treaty commitments, but under the guise of doing the only thing we can do in order to discharge our commitment to our POWs.

Listen, now, to one Richard Falk, identified by the *New York Times* as "Milbank Professor of International Law, at Princeton University." Professor Falk is just back from a trip to Paris where, it is demurely reported, he "met with Vietnam peace negotiators." Professor Falk advises us that there is after all no reason why Hanoi should return our POWs until hostilities have ended, right? Right. After all, says Professor Falk, North Vietnamese who have been bombed and killed by American military also have feelings, right? Right. Therefore, says the Professor, why should they return our prisoners of war prematurely? Why shouldn't they follow the conventional practice of hanging on to them until the war is over?

The Professor, in his report, does not acknowledge a) that the reason there are prisoners of war in the first place is because North Vietnam has been waging an aggressive war against South Vietnam; b) that the Americans have released thousands of POWs, and long since offered to trade prisoner for prisoner; c) that the North Vietnamese have subjected American POWs to conditions of military imprisonment that violate general conventions on the subject whereas we have done no such thing to their prisoners; specifically that d) the NVN refuse to permit American POWs to write letters to their next of kin; e) refuse to identify the prisoners; and f) to permit representatives of the Red Cross to visit them and to report on their state of health.

No, Professor Falk, analyzing in no significant way differently from the way Radio Hanoi would analyze the situation, is utterly one-sided. He cannot repress his conclusions:

"Although the North Vietnamese are prepared to make every effort to expose the hypocrisy of President Nixon's posture on negotiations, they are pessimistic about any real change." The poor, sincere North Vietnamese, face to face with Mr. Nixon's hypocrisies. Just like poor Adolf Hitler, waiting for the Poles and the Czechs to be reasonable.

Well, Mr. Falk, as close observers of that kind of thing know by now, is a fellow traveler of the school of thought that holds America responsible for everything that ever went wrong and no doubt he will find, at Princeton, a little claque, such as is always available to those who force their way onto the stage to present their little bouquets to the Adolf Hitlers or Josef Stalins of their world. One of these days, God willing, our prisoners of war will come home, and when that happens, I'd like to be there when one of them, gaunt from torture and isolation, shows up at one of Professor Falk's walnutted seminars on International Law, to discuss the question of the Hypocrite Nixon versus the Persecuted Prisonermasters of Hanoi. □

JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENT

New York, July 6 — Let's face it, Justice Blackmun made a very telling point about the *New York Times* in his dissenting opinion. The paper had taken to using the argument of time pretty much as convenient. Sometimes it gave the impression that every second counted. Other times, that what the hell we are dealing in matters that are ancient history.

Justice Blackmun remarked the irony that the *New York Times* took three months to prepare its handling of the Pentagon Papers. Then, when the *Times* fired its first shot on a Sunday morning, the Justice Department, the following day at noon, sent a telegram to the *Times* announcing that it would seek an injunction against continued publication of the series. The *Times* was apparently outraged a) at the length of time the Justice Department took in communicating its position (why hadn't Martha Mitchell called the *Times* the evening before?), and b) at the delay, caused by the lower court's injunction, in making the series available to the public. In other words, if the *Times*, having come into possession of the documents early in March, could wait until the middle of June to publish the papers, then why shouldn't the courts have been given a little time to ponder the question whether the series contained information the release of which might be gravely prej-

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udicial to the national interest? Under the circumstances, Mr. Blackmun concluded, the courts, under the synthetic pressure of the situation, had been stampeded into giving opinions which took only cursory account of the factual situation.

It was after all to be expected that the absolutists, which is the kinder word for it than the fanatics, should have taken the extreme position namely that the Constitution of the United States does not authorize under any circumstances such an injunction as the Justice Department asked for against the *Times*. By the same reasoning, Justice Black not long ago opined that there ought not to be any law of libel, because the First Amendment says that there should be no abridgment of free speech.

WHAT MR. BLACKMUN wanted, the majority of the Court denied; namely that the lower courts should take the time thoroughly to review the contending positions. On the one hand there was the Justice Department, insisting that the revelations in store for us would damage the national security. On the other hand, the *New York Times* et al. insisting a) that it was by no means obvious that any such thing would happen and b) that it would surely damage the national security if the government exercised the right to restrain the press.

Accordingly, said Mr. Blackmun, we are left pretty much at the mercy of the discretion of the newspaper publishers, in this case the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. "I strongly urge," said Mr. Blackmun, "and sincerely hope, that these two newspapers will be fully aware of their ultimate responsibilities to the United States of America."

It is a thin lifeline. Not because there is any reason to suppose that the publishers of these papers desire anything less than the best for America, but because we are in fact asked to rely on the final authority of two individuals, Mr. Sulzberger and Mrs. Graham, who came by dynastic succession to their authority. Every now and then, on a fixed schedule, we are given the opportunity to pass judgment on the work of our political representatives.

We are not given such power over the *Times* and the *Post*, nor should anyone aspire to have such power: but, in fact, the publishers of these papers are exercising very grave responsibilities indeed, as Judge Wilkey said in his dissent in the District of Columbia case. Specifically, the papers are engaged in releasing documents which "could clearly result in great harm to the nation," for instance, "the death of soldiers, and destruction of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to negotiate."

This awesome roster Mr. Blackmun repeated, and closed: "to which list I might add the factors of prolongation of the war and of further delay in the freeing of United States prisoners." A high price to pay, if we are to pay it, for one scoop and one stampeded decision. □

CBS VERSUS CONGRESS

New York, July 12 —Here is the background. CBS produced a brilliantly effective documentary called *The Selling of the Pentagon*. Its thesis is that the Pentagon does a lot of PR work, which I found about as surprising as Mr. Agnew's revelation that the networks tend to show a leftward bias. The issue was then raised, and intelligently discussed, whether the documentary had engaged in rather unusual distortions. Any polemical account of anything engages in what one might call distortions, i.e., the stressing of one set of points, and the understressing of another. But it was charged that CBS did more: that the producer took words uttered by a Pentagon official in answer to one set of questions, and appended them to a different set of questions, so as to give the viewer the impression that said Pentagon official was being very perverse and very unresponsive.

AT THIS POINT a congressional committee began to take an interest in the case, and notified CBS president Dr. Frank Stanton that it desired to see all the films that had been taken, from which the final had been put together. To this indelicacy, Dr. Stanton replied: no, citing the freedom of the press. And, indeed, no journalist gladly permits others to see his notes, no artist his early drafts. But Congressman Harley Staggers of the House Commerce Committee turns out to be a tough hombre, and he promptly subpoenaed the CBS rushes. Dr. Stanton refused to produce them, whereupon the subcommittee voted to find him in contempt; and now the senior committee, by a two to one vote, concurs and the House of Representatives will be asked to say yes or no.

Dr. Stanton, who is the soul of honor, insists on reducing the conflict to generic terms. "All this boils down to," he said, "is one central and vital question: Is this country going to continue to have a free press, or is indirect censorship to be imposed upon it? The issue is as simple as that."

But surely the issue is not as simple as that. It is more complicated than that. Congressman Staggers, who by the way is a Democrat, put it this way, in answering Dr. Stanton: "This is the most powerful media we have in America today and *you* talk about 'chilling effect' . . . Where there is untruth put over these networks, they can control this land, and you know they can." Congressman Clarence J. Brown came to the defense of CBS, if not exactly in just the way Dr. Stanton would have liked. "CBS has a right to lie," said Mr. Brown, "and does so frequently." But then Mr. Brown suggested that CBS should devise its own safeguards against a repetition of such distortions as the Pentagon commentary was guilty of. "It is not up to me to decide what's untruthful, biased and slanted, but if Frank Stanton doesn't wake up to the fact that he has a responsibility to the American people, the people will take care of him—or we will take care of him some other way."

Surely Congress is making its own simple point, which is that broadcast licensees, unlike newspaper publishers, are already regulated as it stands, via such articles as the Fairness Doctrine, and that Congress has a continuing responsibility to oversee the broad rules by which the broadcasters are governed.

As recently as in 1959, when the Communications Act was amended, Congress, in granting certain immunities to the television industry, wrote that "nothing in the foregoing . . . shall be construed as relieving broadcasters in connection with the presentation of . . . news documentaries . . . from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act, to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."

Meanwhile, deep down in the news story, one learns that CBS has just now issued a directive governing future documentaries. "One [directive]"—to quote a summary of it—"requires that, if the answer to one question asked of an interviewed person is taken from a reply to another question, the viewer must be so advised." Those who know Frank Stanton will know that his reforms were instituted because of his own commitment to fairness. But those who don't know Frank Stanton will quite understandably believe that his reforms were instituted because of congressional pressure. And that, children, is what congressional pressure is all about. □

(Washington Star Syndicate, Inc.)

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Trans-O-Gram

By SVEND PETERSEN

DEFINITIONS

A. Anything used against an opponent or victim — 85 74 229 7 129 138

B. Air Force Base at Omaha, Nebraska — 61 11 114 144 106 173

C. This made the decipherment of ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics possible — 107 169 219 28 37 48 159 91 94 102 / 93 131

D. A sea-serpent which lures tourists to the Inverness area — 121 6 68 73 90 118 143 120 140 154 / 160 177 221 186 60

E. An explosive device that is used against submarines — 223 9 56 64 97 189 164 171 212 110 / 137

F. The first big job done by the Air Force after it became a separate department — 42 5 27 81 92 99 119 112 116 136 / 147 170

G. A Western Hemisphere capital — 57 178 185 87 228 165

H. Part of the water area around Easter Island (preceded by *Caleta*) — 65 54 211 13 191

I. Where the first engine-powered heavier-than-air flight took place — 158 17 24 34 141 2 29 58 176

J. Boy Scouts who are interested in aviation — 83 31 39 46 162 207 148 194 200 220 / 227 101

K. The top story of a building, having a restaurant or entertainment facilities — 113 10 108 103 124 127 155 20 25 78

L. A poem by William Cullen Bryant — 1 95 125 16 63 72 89 214 47 150 / 157

M. The name of an aircraft carrier — 134 123 225 75 14 88 204 100

N. An instrument with two needles that helps a pilot to land correctly — 163 40 77 105 126 128 218 53 70 172 / 197 208

O. (with WORD P) What World War I fliers formed for air combat — 8 23 62 69 213 3 12 18 33

P. See WORD O — 180 198 80 111 71 195 156 30 43 55

Q. Not paying attention — 215 132 179 36 226 45 209 145 187

R. Abruptly disconnected — 21 133 104 175 196 190 182 115

S. A divination, originally from birds — 98 50 26 217 188 117 38

T. To render harmless or ineffective — 142 66 76 15 151 41 32 161

U. Retaliation for injuries or wrongs — 183 19 201 44 166 152 224

V. The Secretary of Defense, 1947-1949 — 193 122 84 192 59 203 52 135 149

W. A city in Iowa, on the Des Moines River — 222 22 205 79 210 146 184

X. Violent anger — 230 174 167 82

Y. This is said at a cameraman's command — 51 35 86 168 206 202

Z. This aircraft carrier is 1,100 feet long and displaces 85,000 tons — 96 109 130 139 216 4 49 67 181 199

DIRECTIONS

The object of TRANS-O-GRAM is to fill out the puzzle diagram by guessing the WORDS (above) from their DEFINITIONS, and transferring each letter of the guessed word to the correspondingly numbered square in the diagram. When the diagram is filled out it will spell out a quotation from some published work (reading normally from left to right, blank boxes indicating the ends of words); also, when the WORDS have all been filled in above, their initial letters will spell out the author and title of the quoted work. The acrostic feature, and the relative word-lengths in the diagram, will assist in the solution. Spelling and definitions on the authority of *Webster's New International Dictionary*, Second Edition.

See page 826 for solution of last Trans-O-Gram

■	1 L	2 I	3 O	■	4 Z	5 F	6 D	7 A	8 O	9 E	■	10 K	11 B	■	12 O	13 H	14 M	■	15 T			
16 L	17 I	18 O	19 U	20 K	■	21 R	22 W	23 O	24 I	25 K	26 S	■	27 F	28 C	29 I	30 P	31 J	32 T	33 O			
■	34 I	35 Y	36 Q	■	37 C	38 S	39 J	40 N	41 T	42 F	43 P	44 U	■	45 Q	46 J	47 L	48 C	49 Z	50 S			
51 Y	52 V	53 N	54 H	55 P	■	56 E	57 C	58 I	59 V	60 D	■	61 B	62 O	■	63 L	64 E	65 H	66 T	67 Z			
68 D	■	69 O	70 N	71 P	■	72 L	73 D	74 A	75 M	76 T	77 N	78 K	79 W	80 P	81 F	82 X	83 J	84 V	■			
85 A	86 Y	87 G	88 M	89 L	90 D	91 C	■	92 F	93 C	■	94 C	95 L	96 Z	■	97 E	98 S	99 F	100M	101J			
■	102C	103K	■	104R	■	105N	106B	107C	108K	109Z	110E	■	111P	112F	113K	■	114B	115R	116F			
117S	118D	■	119F	120D	■	121D	122V	123M	124K	■	125L	126N	■	127K	■	128N	129A	130Z	131C			
132Q	133R	134M	135V	136F	■	137E	138A	139Z	140D	141I	■	142T	143D	■	144B	145Q	146W	147F	148J			
149V	150L	151T	152U	■	153F	154D	■	155K	156P	157L	158I	■	159C	160I	■	161T	162J	163N	164E			
165G	166U	167X	168Y	■	169C	170F	■	171E	172N	173B	174X	175R	176I	177L	■	178G	179Q	180P	■			
181Z	182R	183U	184W	185G	186D	187Q	188S	189E	■	190F	191H	192V	■	193V	194J	195P	196R	197N	■			
198P	199Z	200J	201U	202Y	203V	■	204M	205W	206Y	■	207J	208N	209Q	210W	211H	212E	213O	■	214L			
215Q	216Z	217S	218N	219C	220J	■	221D	222W	■	223E	224U	225M	226Q	227J	■	228G	229A	230X	■			

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

"Worth a dozen Pulitzer Prizes"

The True Story of Mylai

DESTROY OR DIE

by Martin Gershen

A Selection of the Conservative Book Club

We reprint in its entirety
John Chamberlain's syndicated column, "These Days"

The Real Cause of the Mylai Tragedy

Presidents, one supposes, don't have much time to read books. But there is one book Richard Nixon must read if he is to exercise his final power of review of the Calley case. The book is Martin Gershen's *Destroy or Die: The True Story of Mylai*, published by Arlington House in New Rochelle, N. Y. It is by all odds the most magnificent job of war reporting that has been done on our crazy, mixed-up, stupidly conducted imbroglio in Vietnam, worth a dozen Pulitzer Prizes (which, of course, it won't get), and something to shame every other writer who has competed (at high word rates) to drag the U.S. down in telling the Mylai story.

To make things plain at the beginning, Martin Gershen does not condone the Mylai tragedy. Nor does he admire Lieutenant William Laws Calley, who was "the least liked man" in Charlie Company. To his troops, as quoted by Gershen, Calley was "willing but he really didn't know a whole lot," a most average kid who would have made "a great enlisted man but was not officer caliber." The best that can be said of Calley as a leader is that he tried. Gershen blames the Army for commissioning him, but he blames the country more for its draft law that has allowed officer-material college students to sit out our troubles while the grammar school and high school dropouts have done the fighting.

However, if Calley was not a natural leader, his character, according to Gershen's findings, was not that of a man who would go in for premeditated murder. Calley's instructions, as he understood them, were to "sweep" the village listed on the Army maps as Mylai 4. The village was very definitely a part of the "sea" in which the Viet Cong guerrilla "fish" were swimming, and Gershen makes it plain that the higher-ups, including an important officer who is now dead, wanted it taken off the map.

Sensible men might have demurred in the clutch at "sweeping" a village even in arrantly unfriendly Viet Cong territory from which the adult males had suddenly disappeared. But the point that Gershen makes, after the most devastating job of close-in reporting that has been done in our generation, is that Charlie Company, on the day it was sent out to obliterate Mylai 4, was a zombie outfit, blunted in its wits and crazed in its emotion.

Within a month it had lost 42 men, amounting to 40 per cent of its personnel, to snipers, booby traps and mine field explosions. The deaths in the mine field, as chronicled by Gershen, make such horrifying reading that any reader of this book had better start it in the morning; otherwise he will have a most sleepless night. The disasters that struck Charlie Company came out of a mysterious and wholly frightening void; the company never saw its enemy. The men in the company had been told, and told again, by Viet veterans that women, children and old men among the Viet Cong were commonly enlisted in setting booby traps and delivering grenades; the Viet Cong played by its own Maoist guerrilla rules, which were not covered by the Geneva Convention.

After the culminating disaster in the mine field the dazed survivors should have been taken out of the line and sent somewhere for psychological rehabilitation. Nice American kids had become crazy animals, lusting to get back at the enemy in whatever guise he (or she) happened to materialize. So the Mylai "massacre" happened as our higher brass, in Gershen's opinion, must have been aware it would happen. Gershen thinks the Army wanted to have the whole "Pinkville" area around Mylai 4 wiped off the map; it had been that troublesome. We are told that General William C. Westmoreland gave Charlie Company a letter of commendation for what it had done at Mylai 4, which proves to Gershen's satisfaction that the Mylai story was known at the highest levels.

And the moral to the whole festering tale? Gershen says that what happened at Mylai "was a terribly unfortunate accident of war. It was less serious than the human or mechanical error that causes an artilleryman to fire a round short so that it kills friendly troops . . . We allow for human error and the malfunction of machinery. When will we accept the fact that human minds sometimes go awry, too? At Mylai 4 an undetermined number of enemy suspects were killed inadvertently by an irrational company of men no longer psychologically capable of controlling their acts. The failure at Mylai was caused by bad Army intelligence, faulty leadership, inadequate troop indoctrination, poor judgment and a questionable counter-guerrilla policy."

In summary, Gershen says the "Viet Cong set the rules of war. This is a fact the company never quite understood, and possibly neither did the Army." Our higher brass "had taken a calculated risk at Mylai 4 with a company of sick infantrymen who went berserk. It lost."

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